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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KENNETH CLARK RANSON : 
Petitioner and Appellant 
ProSe 
Appellate Case No. 
vs. : 20060449-CA 
MARIANNA DI PAOLO 
Respondent and Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant appeals the Decree of Divorce and denial of his Motion for New Trial. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter under Utah Code 
Annotated (Utah Code Ann.) 78-2a-3-2(h). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1) That the trail court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a new trial. 
2) That the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for new trial violates Appellant's 
constitutional protections of due process and equal protection of the law. 
3) That the trail court erred in determining Appellant's financial need by failing to make 
any allowance for taxes, including Federal income and Social Security taxes, and Utah 
state income taxes. 
4) That the trail court erred in determining Appellant's financial need by failing to make 
any allowance for: The expense of owning an automobile; The expense of making major 
purchases; Or adequate allowance for the expense of clothing, entertainment, or travel. 
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5) That the trial court erred in determining Appellant's financial need by making no 
allowance for funds for retirement. 
6) That the trial court erred by failing to give any consideration to equalizing the parties 
standards of living after divorce and failed to make any finding as to the parties standard 
of living during marriage. 
7) That the trial court erred by failing to make any adjustment in its award of property or 
alimony in consideration of the fact that the Appellee's earning capacity had been greatly 
enhanced during the marriage by the efforts of both parties. 
8) That the trial court erred in finding that the Appellant can earn $32,000 per year 
immediately when he has been out of the workforce for 20 years, suffers from significant 
health problems, and when his average earnings per year before marriage were $3,230. 
9) That the trial court's decree of divorce is based on illegal sexual prejudice. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issues 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) and 9) are questions of law or mixed questions of law 
and fact and are reviewed by the Court of Appeals for correctness with no deference 
given to the interpretation of the lower court. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517,518. 
Saleh v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 2006 UT 20 
The questions of fact in Issue 8) are reviewed by the Court of Appeals under the 
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932. However that portion of the 
finding based on an erroneous legal conclusion is reviewed for correctness with no 
deference granted to the opinion of the trial court. Saleh v. Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange, 2006 UT 20. In reviewing these issues the Court of Appeals must also 
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consider the patent sexual prejudice shown by the trial court throughout its ruling. The 
effect of this sexual prejudice is a question of law reviewed for correctness with no 
deference given to the interpretation of the lower court. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 
517,518. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
As to the question of the legality and fairness of the trial court's decree, there is a 
lengthy tradition in Utah law which holds that the parties to a marriage are entitled to an 
equal share of its financial success even if only one of them worked outside the home. 
This tradition is made law in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (8), some subsections quoted in 
relevant part below: 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony 
(d) The court may under appropriate circumstances attempt to equalize the parties1 
standard of living. 
(e) If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts 
of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in 
dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
This statute codifies at least five decades of decisions by Utah's appellate courts. 
The authorities cited in the Table of Authorities are only a small fraction of the cases 
affirming these principles. However, as concerns equalizing standard of living during 
marriage, English v English 565 P.2d 409 (1977) and Higlev v Higlev 676 P.2d 379 
(1983) may be taken as authoritative. As concerns the enhancement of one spouse's 
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earning capacity by the efforts of both parties, Martinez v Martinez 818 P.2d 538 (1991) 
may be taken as authoritative. As concerns the need to address funds for retirement in an 
alimony award, Gardner v Gardner 748 P.2d 1076(1988) is authoritative, and as concerns 
the need to address retirement savings, Bakanowski v Bakanowski 80 P.3d 153 (2003)js 
authoritative. 
As concerns the question of a new trial, Maltbv v. Cox Construction Utah 598 
P,2d 336 (1979)is authoritative concerning the applicability to civil cases, State v. Lopez 
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (1994) is authoritative in applying the standards of Strickland v. 
Washington 466 U.S.668 (1984) to cases brought under Utah state law. 
As to the question of sexual discrimination The Constitution of the United States, 
Amendments V and XIV, is authoritative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties in this case were married for 20 years. They moved to Utah so that 
Ms. Di Paolo could pursue a career as a professor of Linguistics at the University of 
Utah. By mutual agreement of the parties Mr. Ranson worked in the home, keeping 
house, caring for their child, managing their investments, and supporting Ms. Di Paolo's 
career. During the marriage Ms. Di Paolo completed her dissertation and received her 
PhD., paid her student loans from marital funds, was fired from her position and restored 
to it as a result of a tenure appeal authored by Mr. Ranson, and went on to become one of 
the most successful women administrators at the University. During the marriage her 
salary went from $ 17,000 to $78,000 per year. 
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Mr. Ranson contributed to the success of the marriage in the following ways. In 
the early years of the marriage he designed, built with his own hands, and primarily paid 
for with the use of the money his parents had given him to pay for a college education, 
the parties home. As a result of the ownership of this home the parties could afford, in 
the early years of the marriage, to live off of Ms. Di Paolo's very low salary and, in the 
later years of the marriage, to amass substantial savings. 
When Mr. Ranson indicated that he wanted to have children Ms. Di Paolo agreed, 
but only on condition that he stay home and care for the child so that she could pursue 
her career. To this Mr. Ranson agreed. As a result he fulfilled all the duties of primary 
care giver for their son including, dressing and bathing the child, organizing his daily 
schedule, choosing day care providers and schools, and fulfilling volunteer requirements 
at those schools. Mr. Ranson also fulfilled all of the duties of homemaker, including 
cleaning, marketing, and routinely preparing 21 nutritious meals from scratch each week. 
In addition Mr. Ranson was actively involved in Ms. Di Paolo career. When Ms. 
Di Paolo was terminated from the University Mr. Ranson conducted an appeal. He 
reviewed University Policies and Procedures, contacted professional organizations, 
arranged for expert witnesses, and authored up to 50 pages of analytic writing per month 
for 14 months, Ms. Di Paolo signed this writing and submitted it as her response in the 
appeal. As a result of this appeal, Ms. Di Paolo was restored to her position at the 
University. This is the only example of a successful tenure appeal at the University of 
Utah within memory. 
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Mr. Ranson acted as unpaid research assistant on Ms. Di Paolo's scholarly work. 
He wrote an extensive article on Utah ethnicity which was used without citation by Ms. 
Di Paolo in her published work. He also collected and analyzed data, prepared research 
materials, and helped to administer tests of linguistic perception. 
Mr. Ranson wrote Ms. Di Paolo's second tenure review which she signed and 
submitted as she had the appeal, and which resulted in the award of tenure to her. Mr. 
Ranson wrote Ms. Di Paolo's Year's Work forms. He conducted a job search on her 
behalf and he researched and wrote a memo which argued that her salary was 
unacceptably low due to sexual discrimination. Each of the above actions resulted in 
Ms. Di Paolo receiving substantial increases in salary. 
When it became necessary for him to seek a divorce, Mr. Ranson contacted 19 
members of the Utah Bar who specialize in family law. None of them would agree to 
represent him if he, a man, intended to seek alimony. Many of them made sexist 
comments to the effect that he could receive alimony if he were a woman but that this 
would not be appropriate because he was a man. 
Finally Bridget Romano agreed to take his case and to seek alimony. However, 
either through incompetence or deliberate fraud, Ms. Romano failed to research and 
prepare anything approaching an adequate case on his behalf. In spite of having 
virtually unlimited time and resources she failed to investigate information necessary to 
his case, withheld crucial information she did possess from the court, and misrepresented 
her actions to Mr. Ranson. 
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The trial court deliberated for ten minutes before returning a massively flawed 
verdict in this matter. The trail court failed to make any allowance for payroll taxes in 
required by statue to consider: the standard of living during marriage, the need to 
equalize standards of living after divorce, and the great enhancement of Ms. Di Paolo's 
earning capacity during the marriage. The ti ial com t foi md that I\ li R anson con ild 
immediateh 1 $32,000 per year when his average earnings in his most productive 
years before marriage were $3,200. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. rhe pai ties wei e man led. on February 28, 1986 in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, [^2, Index on Appeal 520-3) 
2. The decree of Divorce was entered February 10, 2006. (Decree of Divorce, 
Index on
 t appeal 534 12) 
4. Before and during the marriage Mr. Ranson, purchased the lot for, built, and in 
largest part paid for a house. (Trial Transcript, 70, 71-89; Index on Appeal 842, 
Petilionn'\s I\\liibif \ \\u\c*« <m \(i(H/;il 44S> IVtifiontT's l;\Lilii( 4 \m\% \ on Appeal 445, 
Petitioner's Exhibit 5, Index on Appeal 445, Petitioner's Exhibit 6, Index on Appeal 445, 
Petitioner's Exhibit 7, Index on A ppeal ^ 45^ 
5 riiepai ties ha ve one child,, SeanR anson, boi ii Decen iber 2, 1987 (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, f4, Index on Appeal 520-3) 
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6. Ms. Di Paolo insisted that if they were to have a child Mr. Ranson would have 
to stay home and care for the child so that her career would not be interrupted. (Trial 
Transcript 91-93, Index on Appeal 842) 
7. Mr. Ranson was the primary care giver of the parties' son and performed all of 
the duties of a stay at home spouse. (Trial Transcript 105, Index on Appeal 842) 
8. At the beginning of the marriage Ms. Di Paolo's salary was $17,000 per year. 
(Trial Transcript 67, Index on Appeal 842) 
9. After Ms. Di Paolo was terminated from her position at the University of Utah 
Mr. Ranson conducted an appeal on her behalf which resulted in Ms. Di Paolo being 
given an extension of 2 years in which to obtain tenure. (Trial Transcript 93-98, 112-114, 
Index on Appeal 842, Petitioner's Exhibit 8, Index on Appeal 445) 
10. To increase Ms. Di Paolo's salary Mr. Ranson prepared Ms. Di Paolo Year's 
Work forms for her signature. (Trial Transcript 115-118, Index on Appeal 842, 
Petitioner's Exhibit 9, Index on Appeal 445) 
11. Mr. Ranson worked extensively as an unpaid assistant on Ms. Di Paolo's 
scholarly research. (Trial Transcript 98-100, 118-119, Index on Appeal 842, Petitioner's 
Exhibit 10, Index on Appeal 445) 
12. In 1990 Mr. Ranson prepared Ms. Di Paolo responses for her second tenure 
review which resulted in her being granted tenure. (Trial Transcript 101, Index on 
Appeal 842) 
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13. To increase Ms. Di Paolo's salary further, Mr. Ranson organized a job search 
on her behalf (Trial Transcript 102-103, 119 121, Index on Appeal 842, Petitioner's 
Exhibit 11, Index on Appeal \< 15) 
14. To obtain salary equity for Ms. Di Paolo, Mr. Ranson prepared a case 
demonstrating salary inequity based on sexual discrimination against her, (Trial 
Transcript 101, 103 10 1, In lex on Appeal 
15. At the time of trial Ms. Di Paolo earned $78,300 per year. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, ^fl6, Index on Appeal 520-3) 
h ip tri«1 court foi md that I\ Is. Di I *aolo has the ability to pay $2,500 per 
ii •' ' * • ' I 'indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 'ljj535 Index on Appeal 520-
3) 
1 ^ fria1 court deliberated for less than 10 minutes before arriving at its 
deci- .' • •* Di I (ac lo, Videotape 8/29 05, Not inde: ;:ed ) (' The I lonoi a ble Ji idge 
Fratto rises from the bench at 12:03PM and returns at 12:17PM. Allowing a conservative 
5 minutes to walk to and from his office on the floor below leaves 9 minutes for 
deliberation,) 
18. The trial court failed to allow for payroll taxes in calculating Mr. Ranson's 
needs. In spite of the fact that Ms. Di Paolo's own exhibit does this and in spite of the 
Index on Appeal 845, Respondent's Exhibit 29, Index on Appeal 447) 
19, The trial court made no finding as to the standard of living during marriage, 
9 
its failure to do so. The court gave no consideration to equalizing the parties' standards 
of living after divorce and made no statement as to why it failed to do so. The court gave 
no consideration to the great enhancement of Ms. Di Paolo's earning capacity during the 
marriage due to the efforts of both spouses, and made no statement as to why it failed to 
do so. (Trial Transcript 616-629, Index on Appeal 845) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The overwhelming weight of precedent in Utah law holds that in a marriage of 
long duration, when the marriage has enjoyed financial success as a result of the efforts 
of both parties, the parties are entitled to equal standards of living after the marriage, 
even if only one of them worked outside the home. This tradition supercedes the 
previous standard that alimony was adequate if it kept the recipient spouse from 
becoming a public charge, and applies even if the recipient spouse could subsist without 
alimony. This tradition is supported by the equitable principle that it would be unfair for 
a spouse who sacrifices career development and earning capacity so that the marriage 
may prosper as a joint venture, to be made to suffer for that decision at divorce. This 
tradition was finally codified in statute in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (8), which requires 
trial courts to consider this factor in rendering a decision in a divorce. 
The trial court in this matter gave absolutely no consideration to the parties' 
standard of living during marriage, or the need to equalize that standard of living, in its 
decision. It instead ruled that Mr. Ranson could live on less than half of his expenses 
during marriage. This ruling placed him in the position of having to spend down marital 
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assets immediately to survive, while his former wife has tens of thousands of dollars per 
year in disposable income. 
There is an eq\ iall> sti ong traditioi 1 in I ] tali lav\ that w he n one party to amai riage 
has enjoyed a substantial increase in earning capacity due to the efforts of both parties, 
the court will consider this in dividing property and awarding alimony. In this case, as 
described above, }vu. r .in son was of crucial help to I"\ Is Di I 'aolo's career, both as 
liojiicinakcr nnd pi unary cmv giver to their child, and in saving her job and providing 
direct assistance to her work. The trial court again gave absolutely no consideration to 
this in its ruling. 
Indeed, the tria 1 coi u t deliberat 2d for less than ten mini ites in this matter before 
returning a massively flawed decision. The trial court was only able to deny Mr. Ranson 
alimony by failing to subtract federal and state payroll taxes from its accepted level of his 
gross '•. ••-T"* •• - k\l In omsifkT, in asscssiii;1, Mr. Riuu nn \ ncmh ; ^  r 
allowance for the ownership costs of a car, for the purchase of major appliances, adequate 
amounts for the purchase of clothes or travel, or any allowance whatsoever for 
purchased the parties' home from Ms. Di Paolo with his share of their retirement funds. 
The court must allow him either a large sum of money for retirement or a large sum for 
housing, li e.iiuiwl, 111 fnsl»n\ deduct Ixilh. 
The trial court found that Mr. Ranson could earn $32,000 per year immediately 
with no retraining. This amount is 10 times his average earnings in his most productive 
years before marriage, In reaching this decision the ti ial coi 11 t relied on the testimony of 
Kristy Farnsworth. This testimony was deliberately misleading in that it conflated 
accurate data with personal opinion and rank hyperbole. Stripped of its inaccuracies this 
testimony confirms that Mr. Ranson can earn $20,800 per year, which is the figure he 
stipulated to, and is what he in fact earns. 
As concerns the appeal of the denial of Motion for New Trial, the trial court ruled 
that no legal basis exists to grant a new trial in civil matters. In so ruling it relied on a 
memo from Ms. Di Paolo's counsel, which deliberately misquotes the relevant precedent. 
This memo cites only the minority opinion and deliberately ends the citation just before 
the diametrically opposed, and precedential, majority opinion. Utah law requires, in fact, 
that civil litigants have the same right to new trails as criminal litigants, in conformity 
with the two-pronged test of Strickland. This case meets both of those prongs 
abundantly. The facts show that in spite of having time and resources, and repeatedly 
assuring him that she would do so, Mr. Ranson's counsel made no investigation of three 
crucial issues. The facts also show that she withheld from the trail court, apparently 
deliberately, crucial information which she had assured Mr. Ranson she would present. 
This meets abundantly the first prong of the test. The trail court itself identifies two of 
these items as crucial to its decision. This meets conclusively the second prong. 
If this court fails to grant Mr. Ranson a new trail, or to do justice on the available 
facts, it will be sanctioning a novel method for denying him due process of law and equal 
protection of the law. 
There is further substantial evidence that the inequities and irregularities in this 
matter are the result of sexual prejudice. 
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Argument 
[ The Trial Court's Denial of Appellant's Motion for New Trial was based on 
Deliberate Miscitation and Misapplication of Applicable Law. Definitive Evidence 
Supports the Requirement of a New Trial in Accordance with Established Precedent 
In Maltfry v. Cox. Construction, Utah 598 P,2d 336 (1979) then Chief Justice 
Crockett resoundingly rejected the idea that while ineffective assistance of counsel 
provided grounds for a new ti ial in criminal ca ses it did not d :) so in : i\ II cases. In his 
majority opinion Chief Justice Crockett said, in relevant part: 
The main opinion stresses the thought that while incompetence of counsel 
may be a ground for nullifying a judgment in a criminal case, it has not 
been done and therefore should not be done in a civil case. The statement 
seems too broad and inclusive. The purpose of all court proceedings is, of 
course, to do justice. If the processes have so clearly gone awry that an 
injustice has resulted, the court in charge of the trial, or this court on 
review, should rectify such an unfortunate occurrence, whether the 
proceeding is civil or criminal. 
In so saying, I am aware that it is generally said that mistake, error of 
judgment, or negligence of counsel in presenting or defending a case is not 
sufficient cause of vacating a judgment and granting a new trial. However, 
consistent with the principle stated above, it has been held that under 
exigent circumstances, incompetence or negligence of counsel which 
appears to have resulted in an injustice, will justify the granting of a new 
trial. It is therefore my view that in determining whether relief should be 
granted the matter of critical concern should not be as to the nature of the 
proceeding, but whether there is such a strong likelihood that an injustice 
has resulted that good conscience requires that it be remedied. 
rI lie Petitioner and i appellant, hereaftei refei red to a s I\ lr. f! anson, is therefore fi illy 
entitled to request a new trial in this civil matter on the same terms as if it were a criminal 
case. 
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In State v. Lopez 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (1994) Justice Howe, writing for a 
unanimous Utah Supreme Court, accepts in determining effective assistance of counsel 
the two pronged test advanced in Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S.668 (1984). "The 
first prong of the test requires the defendant to show that counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." "The second prong 
requires the defendant to show that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
In Utah v Templin 805 P.2d 182 (1990) then Chief Justice Hall applies these tests 
to facts that closely parallel this case. As concerns the first prong of the test he says for a 
unanimous Utah Supreme Court: 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, 
including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's 
performance cannot fall within the "wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance." This is because a decision not to investigate cannot be 
considered a tactical decision. It is only after an adequate inquiry has been 
made that counsel can make a reasonable decision to call or not call a 
particular witness for tactical reasons. Therefore, because defendant's trial 
counsel did not make a reasonable investigation into the possibility of 
procuring prospective witnesses, the first part of the Strickland test has 
been met. 
Justice Hall also notes that Templin's counsel had adequate time and resources to prepare 
his case, having been hired almost a year before trial and charging Templin $9,000. 
In this case Mr. Ranson's counsel, Bridget Romano, failed to present at trial 
numerous pieces of evidence which would have strengthened his case, of these four were 
crucial: 1) Evidence of Mr. Ranson's continuing serous health problems, 2) Testimony of 
an employment counselor as to Mr. Ranson's current earning ability, 3) Evidence that 
Mr. Ranson's average earnings per year before marriage were $3,230, 4) Evidence of the 
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parties actual expenses during marriage. The first three of these involve decisions not to 
investigate and so specifically meet the first prong of the Strickland test as established by 
the Templin pi ecedent In the case of the foi 11 tit,, after i epeatedly assuring 1\ Ir. R anson 
that she would present this information at trial, Ms. Romano unilaterally and without 
informing Mr. Ranson failed to do so. 
Tvi.. i ,inson retained I\ Is. R omano in September, 200 4 ' I rial in this matter ( as 
held August 16, 2005. Ms. Romano then had nearly 1 year to prepare a case. She 
charged Mr. Ranson over $30,000 in fees. Mr. Ranson supplied her with every piece of 
information she ask./ ,iiro for Tn spite of ; :iis Ms, Romano failed utterly to prepare an 
affirmal > / \ , • = ! 
Numerous memoranda and emails document Ms. Romano failure to prepare a 
case. Space permits reference to only a few crucial ones here. At a meeting on 
November 2(), IDiH Mr, R;mson JJ: - . . • • • • •* ^. - « - ' ^ 
wished to pursue it. (A copy of this inaiio ia included as Addendum A I, Index on 
Appeal 558-63) In this memo he specifically asked Ms. Romano to subpoena his personal 
the steps necessary to make a case for him to receive alimony sufficient to equalize the 
parties incomes, and asked if he should see an employment counselor. On that same date, 
atlei Ihrir nnvhni1, Mi Riinsoii prepared w memo HIJMJUI^  tlml he should n.,i( Mibnnl an 
expense statement based on his expenses during separation but instead on his expenses 
during the marriage so as to reflect the standard of living at that time (A copy of this 
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this brief. Mr. Ranson moved for permission to present them but was denied.) Ms. 
Romano did not object to any of these points and instead assured Mr. Ranson that she 
would pursue the evidence he had cited. Mr. Ranson then prepared a statement of his 
expenses during the marriage and this was used by Ms. Romano during mediation 
(Addendum A-2). 
On March 17, 2005 Mr. Ranson spoke to Dr. Barton and found he was adamantly 
opposed to testifying in court. Mr. Ranson promptly informed Ms. Romano of this. On 
April 5, 2005 Ms. Romano suggested that she prepare a written settlement offer 
(Addendum A-3, Index on Appeal 578). For the next two months Mr. Ranson invested 
many hours a week in supplying information for this offer. This process generated many 
thousands of dollars in fees for Ms. Romano and her firm. On April 22, 2005 Ms. 
Romano thanked Mr. Ranson for his work on this matter and said that she would now 
prepare a written settlement offer. Mr. Ranson continued to supply information to Ms. 
Romano's office until May 24, 2005. Mr. Ranson heard nothing further from Ms. 
Romano until July 18, 2005. On that date she sent him an email which showed that she 
had not prepared a written settlement offer and had in fact forgotten completely about his 
case and all of the information he had paid her thousands of dollars to familiarize herself 
with (Addendum A-4, Index on Appeal 581). 
There were now 13 days left in which Ms. Romano could issue subpoenas and 
submit a witness list. She assured Mr. Ranson that she would get to work on his case 
immediately. She did not. When Mr. Ranson met with Ms. Romano on July 26, 2005 she 
had still done nothing on his case. However, she assured him again that she would. 
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When Mr. Ranson contacted Ms. Romano's office on July 28, 2005 he discovered that 
instead of working on his case she had gone to San Francisco on vacation. In an email on 
that same date Mr. Ranson implored Ms. Romano to obtain testimony from an 
employment counselor. She in fact gave him the name of such a counselor but indicated 
that he would be acting entirely on his own when he consulted her. On August 1, 2005 
the deadline for adding names to the witness list passed and Ms. Romano did not add the 
name of the employment counselor 
On August 3, 2005 Ms. Romano spoke to Dr. Lewis Barton for the first time, nine 
months after Mr. Ranson had first asked her to contact to him. She discovered, as Mr. 
Ranson had told her in March, that Dr. Barton was unwilling to testify. Mr. Ranson then 
provided Ms. Romano with the names of other physicians who were familiar with his 
medical history and could testify on his behalf Ms. Romano stated that it was too late to 
add names to the witness list and told Mr. Ranson that it was his fault his medical records 
could not now be introduced at trial (Addendum A-5, Index on Appeal 594-6). 
On August 4, 2005 Ms. Romano asked Mr. Ranson to prepare a detailed statement 
of his expenses during separation. Mr. Ranson replied that he thought it essential that his 
expenses during marriage be used. He sent Ms. Romano a memo citing Gardner v 
Gardner 748 P.2d 1076(1988), Martinez v Martinez 818 P.2d 538 (1991), and Dunnv 
Dunn 802 P.2d 1314 (1990), to emphasize this. Ms. Romano replied that she had these 
cases in his case file. This assured Mr. Ranson that she intended to pursue the line of 
argument he had set out. In fact, without Mr. Ranson's knowledge or consent, Ms. 
Romano deliberately withheld his statement of expenses during marriage from the court, 
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and submitted as his sole statement of expenses, the statement of expenses during 
separation which she had compelled him to prepare. 
On August 5, 2005 Ms. Romano again stopped preparation for trial saying she 
preferred to pursue negotiation with the Respondent and Appellee, hereafter referred to as 
Ms. Di Paolo. It was only on August 12, 2005 that Ms. Romano informed Mr. Ranson 
that she was again "scrambling" to prepare his case (Addendum A-6). As a result Mr. 
Ranson never saw the exhibits which had been prepared for his own trial except such of 
them as were handed to him on the witness stand. This is why he was unaware his 
expense statement had been changed. 
As a further result of this "scrambling" Ms. Romano never discussed with Mr. 
Ranson his own testimony, which was now almost his sole case. Thus when Ms. Di 
Paolo's counsel asked Mr. Ranson on the witness stand how much he had earned before 
the parties were married, Mr. Ranson was surprised by the question. No one had told him 
that this information might be important and he answered , based on his recollection of 
events 30 years prior, that he might have made as much as $25,000 per year. In fact Mr. 
Ranson5s Social Security records show that his average earnings in his most productive 
years before marriage were $3,230 per year. ( A copy of Mr. Ranson's Social Security 
earnings statement is included as Addendum A-7). 
These facts clearly support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ms. 
Romano completely failed to make any investigation of Mr. Ranson's medical history, or 
witnesses who could testify to it, until it was too late to have that information presented at 
trial. Ms. Romano refused to make any investigation of Mr. Ranson's current 
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employ ability. Ms. Romano failed to make any investigation of Mr. Ranson's 
employment and earnings history. As per Utah v Templin, supra, these are not debatable 
tactical decisions. Because Ms. Romano made no investigation of them whatsoever she 
could not reasonably conclude that the information was not crucial to her client's case. In 
spite of having represented Mr. Ranson for nearly a year before trial, and in spite of 
eventually charging him over $30,000 in fees, Ms. Romano was never quite able to find 
time to prepare a case on is behalf. 
As to her failure to present his expenses during marriage an even more serous 
conclusion emerges. Mr. Ranson and Ms. Romano discussed repeatedly the need for him 
to obtain alimony in an amount which, when combined with what he could earn, would 
allow him to maintain the standard of living he had during the marriage. In his email of 
August 4, 2005, Mr. Ranson gave the specifics of the cases supporting such an award and 
Ms. Romano, in her reply, assured him that they were "in his file." Then when Ms. 
Romano presented that file to the court she deliberately, and without informing Mr. 
Ranson, removed those expenses and never presented them to the court. The simplest 
explanation for this is that Ms. Romano did not believe that Mr. Ranson should receive 
alimony and deliberately removed the evidence that supported his claim so as to prevent 
him from doing so. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is usually the most difficult to meet as the 
party seeking a new trial must show that their counsel's incompetent conduct prejudiced 
the result. In this case however that fact is stated specifically by the decider of fact. In 
its ruling from the bench the trial court states: 
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I think I need to make this finding from the evidence that's been presented 
at this trail and to a preponderance of that evidence...I find that the 
petitioner is able to.. .enjoy.. .an income of $32,000 a year.. .1 base that on 
the testimony and the evidence that I have which is the testimony of the 
Witness Farnsworth. The petitioner responds with an opinion that his age 
prohibits that but I quite frankly don't have much evidence to that, 
competent evidence to that proposition. In fact, the expert in the subject 
opined to the contrary. (Trial Transcript 623-4) 
As concerns Mr. Ranson's health problems the court says: 
The other factor advanced was health considerations and this was the 
petitioner's opinion in terms of both what he suffers from and how it would 
impact the kind of employment that the Witness Farnsworth would opine 
that he's eligible to obtain. These include the optic migraine episodes.. .but 
I'm not convinced from the evidence that that condition or any of the other 
conditions to which Mr. Ranson suffers adversely affects the ability to 
obtain employment of $32,000 per year. (Transcript 624) 
Here the court states specifically that it does not have competent evidence on two 
propositions which it finds crucial to its decision against Mr. Ranson. As shown above, 
Mr. Ranson had been imploring his attorney for at least the last 9 months to produce 
exactly that evidence. She repeatedly assured him she would do so. In fact she never 
made any attempt to do so until, by her own admission, it was too late. Since the court 
itself identifies as crucial to its adverse ruling the absence of two of pieces of evidence 
which were not presented solely due to the ineffective assistance of Mr. Ranson's 
counsel, the second prong of the Strickland test is clearly met. 
There is also a reasonably probability that if the court had been presented Mr. 
Ranson's Social Security earnings history, and known that in his most productive period 
his earnings averaged $3,230 per year, it would not have found that he was capable of 
earning $32,000 per year immediately. 
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There is also a reasonable probability that if the court had been presented Mr. 
Ranson's accurate statement of his expenses during marriage, which showed those 
expenses as $3,400 per month, which does not include the $450 which the court allowed 
for his purchase of comparable health insurance, or any allowance for rent or retirement, 
that the court would not have found that Mr. Ranson's needs were only $2,500 per 
month. Clearly the deliberate suppression of this information by Ms. Romano was also 
crucial to the decision of the court. 
In his response to Mr. Ranson's Motion for a New Trial, Ms. Di Paolo's counsel, 
Robert Pusey, argued that no legal basis exists to seek a new trial in a civil matter on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Memorandum in Opposition, [^5, Index on 
Appeal 604-10, Addendum A-8). Mr. Pusey cites Maltbv v Cox, supra, as his authority 
for this. However he quotes only the MINORITY opinion, stopping just above the 
MAJORITY opinion, which was cited at length above. As shown, this majority opinion 
resoundingly rejects the minority opinion and sets as the standard for the State of Utah 
the precedent that civil litigants are just as entitled as criminal litigants to new trials, and 
on the same grounds. 
Since in all copies of the opinion that Mr. Ranson has seen, the minority opinion is 
directly above the majority opinion, the most logical explanation for Mr. Pusey's claim is 
that he was deliberately trying to mislead the court. The court relied on this false 
information in its denial of Mr. Ranson's Motion for New Trial saying, "The legal 
concept of ineffective assistance of counsel, as a basis to either reverse a decision or 
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mandate a new trial, is applicable only in criminal cases" (Minute Entry April 11, 2006, 
Index on Appeal 638-9, Addendum A-9). 
As then Chief Justice Hall points out in Utah v Templin, Supra, questions of 
ineffective assistance of counsel present mixed questions of fact and law, as a result, 
"reviewing courts are free to make an independent determination of a trial court's 
conclusions." Therefore this court is free to remedy the false reading of the law 
promoted by Ms. Di Paolo's counsel and to grant Mr. Ranson a new trial. 
I IF THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILS TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL IT WILL BE 
SANCTIONING A NOVEL METHOD FOR CIRCUMVENTING THE 
GUARANTEES OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW. 
In attempting to find counsel to represent him Mr. Ranson contacted 19 members 
of the Utah Bar who specialize in divorce law (A table containing specifics has been 
omitted due to length.). Not one of them would agree to take a case in which a man 
sought alimony. In refusing, many of them made comments which indicated sexual 
prejudice including: 'he would receive alimony if he were a woman in the same 
circumstances but could not receive alimony because he was a man/ 'he was lazy and 
had been living off of his wife/ 'an arbiter would beat sense into him'. It was for this 
reason that Mr. Ranson was forced to rely on Ms. Romano. She was the only attorney he 
contacted who would agree to seek alimony on his behalf. However, as can be seen from 
the above, her efforts were at best incompetent and at worst fraudulent. 
If this court refuses to grant Mr. Ranson a new trial it will be sanctioning a novel, 
extralegal method for circumventing the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
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U.S. Constitution. Under the law, when someone has been the victim of illegal prejudice 
they can take the offending party to court and receive relief. But in this case we are 
confronted with a situation where a large body of attorneys all share the same societal 
prejudice. As a result they refuse to represent the victim of discrimination. Eventually 
one of their number does agree to represent him, but fails to place crucial evidence before 
the court, so that the discriminated person is unable to obtain relief. It is then, of course, 
impossible for the appellate courts to provide relief since the crucial information is not 
part of the record. If this court fails to grant a new trail in this matter, or to grant Mr. 
Ranson equality under the law on the extant record, it will be ratifying this method of 
"discrimination by attorney" and placing it beyond the reach of the law. 
When Mr. Ranson's case is seen as it is in fact, his contributions to his marriage, 
his health, his earnings history, his standard of living during marriage, it is irrefutable. It 
is only the incompetence, possibly deliberate, of his counsel that gives any pretense of 
defensibility to the actions of the trial court. To fail to require the trail court to reopen 
this matter would be to countenance a grotesque act of sexual discrimination. 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE EGREGIOUS ERRORS IN DETERMINING 
PETITIONER'S FINANCIAL NEED 
After a trial which took place over parts of four days the court deliberated for less 
than ten minutes before delivering its ruling. This ruling was massively flawed, 
contained egregious errors of fact, and failed to consider essential points of law. 
A. The trial court failed to subtract federal and state payroll and income 
taxes from Mr. Ranson's earnings in determining his income. 
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In determining Mr. Ranson5s earning ability the trail court found that he could 
earn $32,000 per year. This is equivalent to $2,666 per month. The court then 
determined that Mr. Ranson's financial need was $2,500 per month. The trail court then 
concluded that Mr. Ranson had the ability to earn more than his needs. 
This conclusion however completely ignores federal and state income and payroll 
taxes. In Ms. Di Paolo's Exhibit 29 the witness Diana Castell specifically considered this 
and found that on an income of $32,864 Mr. Ranson's net monthly income would be 
$2,117.42 (Index on Appeal 447, Addendum C-l). Using the court's figure of an annual 
income of $32,000 the net monthly income would be $2,071.83 (Calculation omitted due 
to length). This figure is $428.17 less than the need arrived at by the court. 
Thus even if we accept, in arguendo, the ridiculously high earnings figure of the 
court, accept also the ridiculously low need, and accept the complete failure of the court 
to consider any of the statutorily required factors for determining alimony, the minimum 
alimony award to Mr. Ranson should be not $0 but $428 per month, for a period equal to 
the 20 years of the marriage. This failure of the trial court is plain error. 
B. The trial court failed to make any allowance for the ownership costs of an 
automobile, for major purchases such as furniture or appliances, or to 
make adequate allowance for clothing or travel. 
The trial court arrives at its determination of Mr. Ranson's need by taking the 
calculation of his expenses during separation (Addendum C-2, Index on Appeal 445), 
which Ms. Romano submitted without Mr. Ranson5s knowledge, and deducting from 
them what it terms "one time expenses" and living expenses for his son, Sean. The 
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resulting expense calculation is clearly not adequate to meet Mr. Ranson's needs. It 
contains no allowance for the ownership costs of an automobile, for major purchases such 
as appliances or furniture, or remotely adequate allowances for clothing or travel. At the 
time the expenses during separation were incurred Mr. Ranson was desperately 
attempting to both attend college and to raise enough money to pay his attorneys. Since 
he had no access to his savings he was forced to borrow money to live. Naturally he 
deferred purchases which would be a normal part of an American household budget. 
As Mr. Ranson testified at trial the automobile expense listed is just enough for 
gas and repairs on a 14 year old car. If Mr. Ranson were to purchase a car the equivalent 
of the one Ms. Di Paolo received in the property settlement, which then had a value of 
$22,000, and if he were to obtain a 5-year car loan at 5.25% interest, this would require a 
monthly payment of approximately $450. 
Even if this court rejects Mr. Ranson's argument that he should be able to 
maintain the standard of living during the marriage, it is not reasonable to expect that he 
would be able to live without purchasing a car, appliances, furniture, or clothing If any 
reasonable allowance is made for these purchases, the minimum amount of alimony Mr. 
Ranson should receive increases from $428 to more than $1,000 per month. The failure 
of the trial court to include basic necessities in its analysis of Mr. Ranson's need is clear 
and prejudicial error. 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO PROVISION FOR FUNDS FOR RETIREMENT 
IN DETERMINING PETITIONER'S NEED AND MADE NO FINDING AS TO 
WHY IT FAILED TO DO SO 
25 
During the marriage Mr. Ranson paid for and built a house which the parties 
owned without encumbrance. The parties also made regular contributions to a retirement 
account, 25 times a year, automatically, from every paycheck, every year, for 20 years. 
During settlement negotiations Ms. Romano insisted that Mr. Ranson purchase Ms. Di 
Paolo's interest in the home in return for an equal dollar amount of their retirement 
account. For this reason no need for rent or mortgage appears in Mr. Ranson's expenses, 
a fact crucial to the trial court's denial of alimony. However, Mr. Ranson now has a large 
need for retirement funds, a need which the trial court gave no consideration in its ruling. 
At this time Mr. Ranson is 55 years old which means he is 9 1/4 years from 
retirement age. He has approximately $42,000 in retirement savings. After taxes and 
legal fees he has $46,000 in other savings. Because he remained home to support Ms. Di 
Paolo's career and to raise their son, Mr. Ranson is not qualified for Social Security 
benefits. If we accept the unreasonably high finding of the trial court and assume Mr. 
Ranson can earn $32,000 immediately and every year until retirement, Mr. Ranson will 
be eligible for $685 in social security retirement benefits (Calculation omitted due to 
length). If we assume that Mr. Ranson can retire on 70% of his court allowed $32,000 
income, he will have a need for retirement savings of $2,800 per month to retire at age 65 
(Omitted due to length). This example of course does not explain why Mr. Ranson 
should be living on $22,400 a year in retirement while Ms. Di Paolo will be living on an 
income over three times as large. 
In Gardner v Gardner, supra, the Utah Supreme Court considered the question of 
the need for alimony in retirement. It overturned the alimony award of the trial court and 
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remanded for further proceedings in part because the trail court's award of alimony "is 
insufficient to equalize the parties standard of living following.. .retirement." 
In Bakanowski v Bakanowski 80 P.3d 153 (2003) this court addressed the issue of 
whether the present need to save for future retirement could ever be a part of an alimony 
determination. It found that, "The critical question is whether funds for post-divorce 
savings, investment, and retirement accounts are necessary because contributing to such 
accounts was standard practice during the marriage and helped form the couple's marital 
standard of living." In the present case that requirement is abundantly met. 
At trial Mr. Ranson testified several times to his need for alimony to provide funds 
for retirement (Transcript 132, 149, 196). In spite of this the court made no finding 
concerning this issue and made no provision for retirement savings or equal standards of 
living after retirement in its consideration of alimony. This is clear and prejudicial error. 
V THE TRIAL COURT GAVE NO CONSIDERATION TO THE STANDARD OF 
LIVING DURING THE MARRIAGE IN DETERMINING PETITIONER'S NEED 
AND MADE NO FINDING AS TO WHY IT FAILED TO DO SO 
Utah Code §3-3-5(8)(c) states that, "as a general rule, the court should look to the 
standard of living existing at the time of separation in determining alimony." It allows 
the court to base alimony on the standard of living at the time of trial if this is supported 
by "equitable principles." In this case the trial court based its decision solely on the 
standard of living at the time of trial, gave no consideration to the standard of living 
during marriage, and made absolutely no mention of its reasons for doing so. 
The overwhelming weight of precedent in Utah law requires alimony to be based 
on the standard of living that existed during the marriage. This tradition began with 
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MacDonald v Macdonald 236 P.2d 1066(1951) in which the Utah Supreme Court 
disposed of the previous tradition that alimony was adequate if it prevented the wife [sic] 
from becoming a public charge and found instead that divorced parties are entitled to be 
provided for according to their "station in life". 
By the time of English v English 565 P.2d 409 (1977) our supreme court, citing its 
own previous opinion, stated with absolute clarity: 
the most important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife [sic] as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage. 
In Higley v Higley 676 P.2d 379 (1983) then Justice Durham , writing for the court 
majority, stated: 
An alimony award should, in as far as possible, equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living and maintain them as close as possible to the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. 
One argument that Ms. Di Paolo may have meant to advance at trial is that the trial 
court should read Jones v Jones 700 P.2d 1072 (1985) as superceding the previous 
citations. In Jones our Supreme court proposes a three-pronged test for alimony, the 
second prong of which is the ability of the wife [sic] to produce income for herself. Ms. 
Di Paolo may have intended to claim that this is a reversion to the old public charge 
doctrine, and may have intended for the court to interpret this as meaning that if the 
recipient spouse can support themselves without public assistance, alimony is not 
required. This reading is completely false. Immediately before proposing its three-
pronged test the Jones court quotes the passage from English v English already cited 
above and says that it is for this purpose, the purpose of supporting the wife [sic] at the 
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standard of living during the marriage (Italics added), that the three-pronged test is 
promulgated. 
The only citation to law that the trial court even suggests in its ruling is when it 
seems to paraphrase English v English, supra, in saying that alimony is neither an annuity 
or a penalty (Transcript 621). In English the court says that alimony is neither "a penalty 
against the husband nor a reward to the wife." However the court in English immediately 
afterward makes the statement quoted above, that the purpose of alimony is to support the 
recipient at the standard of living of the marriage (Italics added). 
The trial court seems to follow English further as it next acknowledges the "need 
to take into account the standard of living that one enjoyed when they were married" 
(Transcript 622). But having said this, the trial court gives absolutely no consideration to 
the standard of living during marriage and proceeds to base its ruling solely on the 
standard of living during separation when, as pointed out above, Mr. Ranson was living 
in desperate financial circumstances. 
The issue of his expenses was mentioned by Mr. Ranson at several points during 
the trial (Transcript 154, 295). He discusses several times submitting a statement of his 
expenses during marriage at mediation, and discusses some of the ways in which the 
statement of his expenses during separation fails to reflect the required level of expenses. 
During this testimony Mr. Ranson had no idea that his attorney would not submit his 
actual expenses during marriage to the trial court. 
Clear precedent exists for this court to set aside the trial court's reliance on the 
expense calculation at time of trial and use the calculation that reflects the standard of 
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living during marriage. In Gardner v Gardner, supra, the trial court relied on a 
calculation which listed Mrs. Gardner' expenses as $1,200 per month. In reaching its 
verdict our Supreme Court relied, instead, on a calculation Mrs. Gardner prepared prior to 
trial, which listed her expenses as $1,700 per month. It found that this was a reasonable 
expression of her needs and that it supported her claim for alimony in that amount. It 
therefore reversed and remanded for further action. 
In comparing the statement of Mr. Ranson's expenses during separation relied on 
by the trial court (Addendum C-2), with the statement of Mr. Ranson's expenses during 
marriage which was used at mediation in February, 2005 (Addendum A-2), it can be seen 
that the total amount of Mr. Ranson's expenditures is actually higher at the time of trial. 
What is different is the nature of the expenses. During separation Mr. Ranson is living 
off of borrowed money and paying enormous legal fees. These needs replace more 
normal ones such as automobile and appliance payments. When the trial court leaves out 
these extraordinary expenditures it arrives at a figure that is 73% of Mr. Ranson's 
expenses during marriage for similar, after tax items. However, this figure does not 
include the $455 per month allowed by the trial court for Mr. Ranson to purchase 
comparable health care, or any allowance for retirement. Adding these items makes the 
actual shortfall more than 50% of his normal expenses. 
This court should follow the abundant precedent in marriages of long duration and 
base its assessment of Mr. Ranson's need on the standard of living during marriage. It 
should follow the precedent of Gardner and base its assessment of this need on 
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Addendum A-2, adding to that amount provision for health care and retirement, which 
during the marriage were pre-tax expenditures. 
The failure of the trial court to base Mr. Ranson's need on his standard of living 
during marriage or to make any finding as to why it did not do so is a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO ATTEMPT TO EQUALIZE THE PARTIES 
STANDARDS OF LIVING AFTER DIVORCE AND MADE NO FINDING AS TO 
WHY IT FAILED TO DO SO 
The same tradition of law that requires the needs of parties to be based on the 
standard of living during marriage also requires that in marriages of long duration, where 
the parties have prospered as a result of their joint efforts, the standards of living of the 
parties after marriage be equalized to the extent possible. Indeed the purpose of basing 
the needs of the parties on the standard during marriage is so that a decree can be 
fashioned that maintains it afterward. This is clear from the quotations from the rulings 
in English v English, and Higlev v Higlev, supra. 
In Frank v Frank 585 P.2d 453 (1978) the trial court awarded alimony even though 
it stated at one point in its ruling that "in one sense plaintiff does not need alimony in that 
she could probably subsist without it." The payor spouse appealed on the grounds that 
this finding demonstrated that alimony was not necessary. Writing for a unanimous Utah 
Supreme Court then Justice Crockett rejected this argument saying: 
How the defendant, or anyone on his behalf, could even suggest that a wife 
who had devoted 21 years to her marriage and reared a family should be 
turned out to subsist on her own is as discordant with our sense of justice as 
it was to the trial judge. 
31 
In Rasband v Rasband 752 p.2d 1331 (1988) in rejecting an award of declining 
alimony as insufficient the Utah Court of Appeals said: 
The award herein leaves Mr. Rasband with some discretionary income and 
Mrs. Rasband with none. The lower court found $45,000 of disposable 
income. He needs $18,000 annually and she needs $16,800, for a total of 
$34,800. This leaves him with $10,000 annual discretionary 
income.. .These facts appear to warrant permanent alimony in an amount 
greater than $800. 
In Dunn v Dunn, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial 
court which awarded the husband the largest portion of the marital property. The Court 
of Appeals found that, Mrs. Dunn was "an equal partner in the marriage." It rejected the 
ruling that Dr. Dunn was entitled to a superior financial position after the divorce because 
in the words of the trial court, "the period of the marriage covered probably the most 
productive period of his life." The Court of Appeals noted that these years were also the 
most productive of Mrs. Dunn's life during which time she "gave up or at least greatly 
postponed... pursuing her own education and career." 
The parallels between Mr. Ranson's situation and those of the prevailing parties in 
these, the foundational precedents for Utah law governing divorce, are compelling. Mrs. 
Gardner had been married 38 years. She had not worked outside the home in 30 years. 
As a stay at home spouse, she supported Dr. Gardner's career while he built a successful 
medical practice. She had once been a skilled executive secretary but the court found that 
it would be difficult for her to regain those skills after so long an absence. She received 
property and alimony to equalize their standards of living. 
Mrs. Higley was married 30 years. The Utah Supreme Court found that her work 
as a homemaker had made her husband's successful career as a welder possible. Mrs. 
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Frank was married 21 years. She helped her husband succeed as a heart surgeon. While 
he was hospitalized with an emotional illness she opened a gift shop with the help of her 
parents and supported the family. 
Mrs. Jones was married 30 years. During the marriage the parties established a 
successful pharmacy. She worked occasionally in the business and also did extensive 
volunteer work, in addition to raising their children and maintaining their home. 
Mr. Ranson was married for 20 years. During the marriage he raised the parties 
son and maintained their home. He supported his wife's career. When she was fired 
from her tenured job as a professor he wrote the appeal that resulted in her being 
reinstated. He did unpaid work on her articles, researching and writing portions of them. 
He paid for and built their house. 
All of the spouses in the foundational cases above received alimony and/or 
property sufficient to allow them to maintain the standard of living during marriage. Mr. 
Ranson received zero alimony. He was, as the Frank court put it, "turned out to subsist on 
his own" as though the marriage had never happened and as though he had no part in 
creating, and no claim on, Ms. Di Paolo's financial success. 
At trial Mr. Ranson submitted several schedules showing the amount of alimony 
needed to equalize the incomes of the parties after taxes. These used a higher gross 
income for Ms. Di Paolo than was accepted by the court. A schedule is included showing 
the amount of alimony which would equalize the parties incomes at Ms. Di Paolo's 
current salary level and at two levels of income for Mr. Ranson, the $32,000 the trial 
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court found he could earn, and the $20,800 he actually is capable of earning (Addendum 
F-l). 
The schedule also shows that equalizing incomes does not in fact equalize the 
parties' standards of living since Ms. Di Paolo receives benefits which total 23% of her 
salary and which pay for her medical insurance and retirement. Mr. Ranson must pay 
these expenses out of his after tax income. 
The failure of the trial court to award alimony which will equalize the parties' 
standards of living and maintain them at the level during the marriage, or to offer any 
reason why it did not do so, is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO ADJUSTMENT TO ITS AWARD OF 
PROPERTY, OR IT'S FAILURE TO AWARD ALIMONY, IN CONSIDERATION 
OF THE GREAT ENHANCEMENT OF MS. DI PAOLO'S EARNING 
CAPACITY THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF BOTH PARTIES DURING THE 
MARRIAGE, AND MADE NO FINDING AS TO WHY IT FAILED TO DO SO 
During the course of this marriage Mr. Ranson has made enormous contributions 
to the advancement of Ms. Di Paolo's career. In the first instance, he stayed home to 
manage their household and raise their child. Under Utah case law these contributions 
alone make him a full partner in the marriage, see Higlev v Higlev, and Dunn v Dunn, 
supra. But Mr. Ranson's contributions went far beyond that to active support for Ms. Di 
Paolo's career. 
In 1988 Ms. Di Paolo was fired from her tenure track job as a professor at the 
University of Utah. Mr. Ranson did almost all of the work on an appeal of this firing 
including: contacting witnesses, researching evidence, and writing responses for Ms. Di 
Paolo's signature. As a result, for the first time in the memory of anyone at the 
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University such an appeal was successful and Ms. Di Paolo was restored to her position. 
Thereafter Mr. Ranson worked as an unpaid assistant on Ms. Di Paolo's scholarly 
publications, performing research and writing sections of her articles. He also wrote her 
Year's Work letters, which are essentially applications for raises, and prepared 
applications for other, more remunerative, positions for her signature. 
As a result of the efforts of both parties Ms. Di Paolo's salary went form $17,000 
per year at the beginning of the marriage to $78,000 per year at the time of trial. 
There is a long tradition in Utah case law that when the parties have prospered 
through their joint efforts that this should be acknowledged in awards of property and 
alimony in the event of divorce, see Higley v Higley, Jones v Jones, Frank v Frank, and 
Gardner v Gardner, supra. This tradition received its clearest statement in Martinez v 
Martinez, supra, In this case the Utah Supreme Court stated unequivocally "if one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and in awarding alimony." 
In a concurring opinion, then Justice Zimmerman stated that, "there can be no 
doubt that trial judges are empowered and enjoined to take circumstances like those 
presented here into account in making alimony and property division awards." 
In this same matter then Justice Durham offered a dissenting opinion. Unlike Ms. 
Di Paolo and her counsel, Mr. Ranson does not argue that minority opinions confer 
authority, but this opinion goes so directly to the facts of this case that it must be brought 
before this court. Justice Durham wrote in part: 
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The legal status quo is unacceptable...and I hope that the majority will be 
willing in the future to make good on its representation that the concept of 
alimony...can be accommodated to the need for equity. Unless and until 
that happens any woman (or man, for that matter) who sacrifices her own 
education, earning capacity, or career development so that a spouse may 
advance and the marriage may prosper as a joint venture will inevitably 
suffer the full cost of that decision at divorce, while the advantaged spouse 
will continue to walk away from the marriage with all of the major 
financial gain. That is unfair, and.. .the responsibility of the law is to seek 
fairness. 
This statement exactly describes this case. Mr. Ranson sacrificed his career, his 
earning capacity, his education, to advance the career of his wife. When they divorced he 
was told by the trial court that it was fair that he should live at the level of whatever he 
could earn now, with no right to live at the level the parties had earned during marriage, 
with no allowance for the reduction a 20 year break in his career had made in his earning 
capacity, and with no consideration for the substantial health problems he had developed 
with age. 
When Mr. Ranson and Ms. Di Paolo began their marriage they had very little. He 
had his college money, which he invested in their home. She had her job at the University 
of Utah, which she promptly lost, but together they persevered and they succeeded 
beyond their wildest dreams. She became a department chair at the University and her 
salary went from $17,000 to $78,000 per year. Anyone would have thought that they 
were both successful, but this is wrong. According to the trial court only Ms. Di Paolo 
succeeded and Mr. Ranson has no claim to her success, and no claim on her earning 
power, which was created through the efforts of them both. 
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Even if we accept, in arguendo, the trial court's absurd finding that Mr. Ranson 
can earn $32,000 immediately, and accept also its finding that he can live on less than 
li.ilf of his expenses dmine, the iiKiniiiiie, his income is still n"l cnoiM'J) lo meet his needs. 
Mr. Ranson must begin spending down marital assets immediately just to live. He must 
spend these same assets to pay for his retirement. Thus the ruling of the court envisions 
to near nothing in retirement, while Ms. Di Paolo has substantial assets she need not 
touch, retirement more than adequate to maintain her standard of living, and an income of 
$78,000 per year. 
This situation is clearly and grotesquely unfair. If precedent did not already exist, 
this court would have to craft an equitable remedy to correct this situation. But In fact, in 
the statute and in case after case of precedent, the laws oi i , M already address this 
situation and find it ii ltolerable. • . 
Consider the words of two distinguished jurists w ho would go on to become Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, of I Jtah. Chief Justice Crockett asks, "How the defendant, 
marriage.. .should be turned out to subsist on her own." Chief Justice Durham asks how 
it is fair that, "any woman (or man, for that matter) who sacrifices her own education, 
may prosper as a joint venture will inevitably suffer the full cost of that decision at 
divorce" and concludes "That is unfair, and.. .the responsibility of the law is to seek 
fairness." ' • 
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The law of Utah provides a remedy for the injustice of this situation and that 
remedy is routinely applied to circumstances exactly matching those in this case. There 
are strong indications that it was not applied here solely due to illegal sexual prejudice. 
To do justice in this matter, it is only necessary for the Court of Appeals to apply the law 
impartially. 
m i THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING IS BASED ON ILLEGAL SEXUAL 
PREJUDICE 
There is substantial evidence to indicate that the ruling in this matter was the result 
of sexual prejudice. To confirm this Mr. Ranson undertook a statistical study of divorce 
cases filed in Third District Court contemporaneously with his. He examined a total of 
297 cases(case numbers 044900577 through 044900781, 054904232 through 054904248, 
and 064902574 through 064902651, Summary of data omitted due to length). The 
majority of these cases were from the period February, 2004 through April, 2004, in 
which month Mr. Ranson filed for divorce. He also sampled cases from other periods to 
confirm that this period was not a statistical aberration. To find cases comparable under 
the law to his, Mr. Ranson considered only marriages of long duration, which he took to 
be of 10 years duration or greater. 
The results of this study can be given in one sentence. In every case of a marriage 
of long duration, in which a spouse requested alimony, they received alimony. There is 
no instance of a spouse in a marriage of long duration, during the period in which Mr. 
Ranson filed, in the court in which he filed, requesting alimony and being denied, except 
in the case of Mr. Ranson. 
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In the cases in which a spouse requested alimony, a combination of alimony, child 
support, and or, property awards usually served to equalize the parties' standards of 
living after marriage. As an example, in the ca.se of Williams v Williams, 04490-0601, 
the parties were married for 22 years. They had one child who was 12 at the time of 
divorce. The husband earned $5,417 gross per month, $65,004 annually. The wife 
earned $1,5 70 gross monthly, $18,8' 10 annually, at two part time jobs. 
The wife was a\* arded t\\ o thii (is erf the eqi iit> ii I the home, a 2002 model car, 
child support of $530 per month, and alimony of $1,000 per month for a time equal to the 
duration of the marriage. As a result of this ruling in the first year after divorce her 
monthly gross income limn ,ill sources nunlti be $1,101,1 iiinl In , nnuM be $1,8X7, She 
would be compensated for the difference by increased equity in the home. 
This case is almost identical to the one before this court. In the current case the 
parties were married 20 yea i s, their child wa s • ' :- N R arisen 
had no earnings. In the case of Williams, Mrs. Williams received $530 per month in 
child support and $1,000 per month in alimony so that the discrepancy in incomes was 
no alimony, and the difference in incomes after divorce, even using the unsupported 
income finding of the trial, court is $3750 per month. That is, the difference is $1 100 
niein, llian Mi. k.mson's imputed income. 
Numerous other examples with strongly similar outcomes have been omitted 
solely due to the length requirements of this brief. There is only one substantive 
difference between I\ Ir. Ranson and the spouses who w ere granted alimony and equal 
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standards of living. All of them are women and Mr. Ranson is a man. These facts 
provide clear evidence that Mr. Ranson is the victim of sexual discrimination. This 
sexual discrimination is a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution of 
the United States. As such it is clear and prejudicial error. 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE AN ERROR OF FACT IN FINDING THAT MR. 
RANSON CAN EARN $32,000 PER YEAR WHEN HIS AVERAGE EARNINGS 
PER YEAR BEFORE MARRIAGE WERE $3,230 
In reaching its decision that Mr. Ranson could earn $32,000 per year immediately 
the trial court relied on the opinion of Kristy Famsworth, a self employed vocational 
specialist. Dr. Famsworth holds a PhD. in human development and has 20 years 
experience in her field. Dr. Famsworth submitted a ten page written report in which she 
finds that Mr. Ranson can find employment in fields ranging from customer service 
representative to first line supervisor/manager of construction workers at "salaries" 
ranging from $19,760 to $32,864. She also indicates in her report and testimony that 
these "salaries" are really too low and that Mr. Ranson can easily earn up to $45,000 per 
year. The court accepted this testimony and found that Mr. Ranson could earn $32,000 
per year almost immediately. (A copy of Dr. Famsworth's report is included as 
Addendum H-l, Index on Appeal 445) 
In reaching its decision the trial court failed to recognize the large number of crucial 
flaws that make Dr. Famsworth's testimony not only completely unreliable but deliberately 
misleading. As she acknowledges in her testimony, Dr. Famsworth obtained information only 
from Ms. Di Paolo and made not attempt to contact Mr. Ranson. (Transcript 5, 20) As a result 
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Dr. Famsworth 's opinion is really only the opinion of Ms. Di Paolo placed in the mouth of a 
supposed expert. 
I IT. larnswoith did nol have a ivtss In Mr Ransorfs ,K lual turnings hislorv II i" 
ii. possible to believe that she would have concluded that he was capable of earning 
$32,000 immediately if she had known that his average earnings per year as a carpenter 
had been $3,200. Di F arnsworth believed that 1\ lr. R anson had been a licensed general 
contractoi v«v hen he had not Dr I 'arnswor th was not given accurate information about 
Mr. Ranson 's medical condition. She believed that he suffered from migraine headaches 
and was never told that he suffers from atypical migraine episodes that can blind n. m 
\\ iflioul warning" for periods up to one lioui, I >r Famsworth also made no allowance for 
layoffs even though she admitted under oath that construction does not provide full time 
employment. 
The record also show s tl lat Dr Farnswoi 1:1 I delibera tel;;« mislead the coi 
this by suggesting in her report and testimony that Mr. Ranson could occupy jobs which 
she was forced to admit under oath he was not qualified iw; <he also suggested that 
admit under oath that she had consulted no such evidence. 
On page ten of her report Dr. Farnsworth lists the actilal conclusions of her 
$24,336 as a finish carpenter, to $32,864 as a "first line construction manager". But 
throughout her report and testimony she refers to jobs such as "construction manager" 
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jobs as well. Under cross examination Dr. Farnsworth admits that Mr. Ranson is not 
qualified to be a "construction manager" and that the only jobs he is qualified for are the 
three identified above from her conclusion on page 10 (Transcript 36). When asked why 
she would include higher paying jobs in her report at all Dr. Farnsworth replies with a 
non-sequiteur saying that such jobs would not be a good option for Mr. Ranson 
(Transcript 37). Dr. Farnsworth thus tacitly admits to larding her report with discussion 
of high paying options for which Mr. Ranson is not qualified. 
The second way in which Dr. Farnsworth deliberately misleads the court is by 
suggesting that Mr. Ranson will receive rapid raises from the levels of starting "salary" 
she lists. The only evidence she gives for this however concerns the customer service 
jobs (Transcript 12). She suggests to the court that such rapid raises are available in the 
construction industry as well and refers to government figures which show this. 
However, later in her testimony, she admits that she did not actually consult any such 
statistics in preparing this report and that this claim is based only on her unsupported 
opinion (Transcript 13). 
In her testimony Dr. Farnsworth admits that she gave no consideration to Mr. 
Ranson5s health problems in making her analysis. As he testifies to the court, Mr. 
Ranson, suffers from atypical migraine, gout, high cholesterol, rosacea, and 
sleeplessness, and takes six prescription medicines daily to treat these conditions. Crucial 
to his work ability is atypical migraine, the symptoms of which are not headache but 
episodes of blindness which come on with no warning and last up to one hour. Mr. 
Ranson experiences such symptoms hourly and experiences the longer episodes three to 
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four times a year. Obviousiy u he were to have such an episode on a construction site he 
could be killed. 
Mr. Ranson takes the medicine Inderal to prevent these episodes froi n 'being more 
severe This niediciiie km ers his hear t rate so mi ich that he cannot exert himself until he 
has gradually exercised over a period of 10 to 15 minutes. This makes it completely 
impossible for him to work on construction jobs, where the ability to go from doing the 
most sedentary detail w ork to heav y lifting, immediately ,, is cr ucial. In her report Dr. 
Famsworth identifies this skill as "explosive strength" and says Mr. Ranson's possession 
of it is important to her analysis. (H 1, pA) 
In her testimony Dr. Farnswoilh nJ'niils llial shr lliouj-jil Mr. Riinson suffered from 
headaches (Transcript 28), that she did not have enough information to consider the 
effects of his health on Mr. Ranson's employability (Transcript ?,9\ and that she would 
m v ' i •» t-: • * v - \ ' h ^ ! \ j;v>; ; -• • • " : . . . - . • • ^ <• •• ' • 1 
affect his abihiy 10 do construction work (Transcript 30). 
In arriving at her figures for "minimum starting salary" Dr. Famsworth also fails 
to COIIMIILT the iTfo.l nl'lay il'l'i \\ hilr i^ie rails HK'M* I'IJMIIV*; "salaried1 hn uwn 
calculations show that these are hourly earnings and that she has arrived at the final 
figures by assuming full time employment. However, under cross-examination Dr. 
(Transcript 40-1). Therefore a deduction for time off, perhaps on the order of 20% or 
30%, must be made form Dr. Famsworth's figures to find Mr. Ranson's actual annual 
earnings. 
Stripped of its deliberate deception Dr. Farnsworth's report does not contradict but 
confirms Mr. Ranson's stipulation that he can earn $20,800 per year. Dr. Farnsworth lists 
a staring salary for Mr. Ranson as a carpenter of $24,336, which must be reduced for 
layoffs. This gives a figure almost identical to Mr. Ranson's stipulated earnings. In an 
attempt to arrive at a higher value, Dr. Farnsworth first argues that Mr. Ranson is 
qualified to be a "first line construction manager". She supports this idea with the claim 
that Mr. Ranson was once a Licensed General Contractor. The sole evidence for this is a 
license form labeled "contractor" shown to her by Ms. Di Paolo. Dr. Farnsworth claims 
that in 1986 there was only one type of contractor's license, that this means that Mr. 
Ranson was a general contractor, and that therefore he is qualified to manage 
construction. 
In fact in 1986 contractor's licenses were differentiated by the dollar value of open 
contracts the licensee could have at one time. Mr. Ranson's license permitted a 
maximum value of $5,000, therefore he was clearly not a general contractor. In fact, as 
shown by his earnings statement (A-7), Mr. Ranson did not contract for work using this 
license and obtained it solely so that he could buy materials for the parties' home at 
wholesale prices. 
When challenged on this point Dr. Farnsworth admits that she does not know 
whether Mr. Ranson was a general contractor or not (Transcript 26). She argues that her 
belief that Mr. Ranson was a general contractor was not a factor in her determination that 
he was capable of being a construction supervisor (Transcript 22). She then contradicts 
herself, again, by referring repeatedly to the idea that Mr. Ranson was a general 
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contractor and claiming that this provides support for her idea that he is qualified as a 
supervisor (Transcript 35) 
Having disposed of the idea that 1^  Ii R ansoi 1 is qi lalified to occi lpy management 
positions there is only one way in which Dr. Famsworth can support a claim that he can 
earn more than the amount he stipulated, and that is by insisting that Mr. Ranson can 
finish carpenter (Transcript 15). She bases this on no data whatsoever but solely on her 
personal opinion based on "the years of experience he has had". Under examination Dr. 
Famsworth denies llr.it utiv ullowaitiv intisl W made I'm' (he veins Mi. Raiison,has been 
out of the workforce because carpentry consists of "pounding nails, that certainly there's 
not much change in that" (Transcript 27N T1- s is u t ^ '\ classist prejudice but shows 
]> ^ • • • -. -
 : ( . * •,. i : '> • . consti i iction in the last 20 
years. Dr. Farnsworthfs testimony on this point shows her desperation to reach a 
conclusion that shows Mr. Ranson can make $32,000 per year, in accordance with the 
wishes of her client 
Reference to his earnings statement (A-7) should remove any doubt that Mi 
Ranson's is not able to earn in this range. In fact the only job he has been able to obtain 
since tin: di\ntve w;is ;i tempnrarv mie at llnine Pqmi whii.li paid hint 'k|0 per hour, 
which would be $20,800 per year if he worked full time. (Mi. Ranson's VV -2 
included due to length) 
Fiiiall) , let us assume, in arguendo, that Mr. Ranson's health problems did not 
prevent him from working constn iction I le is 55 years old If hew ere able to perform 
-is . • ' '.. : 
the strenuous activities of construction now, would he be able to do so in 5 years when he 
is 60, in 10 years when he is 65? Mr. Ranson has no financial ability to retire. He will 
have to work as long as he lives. It is obvious that he must retrain now, in a field other 
than construction, which he will be able to pursue for as long as he can stand upright. 
i CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Petitioner and Appellant prays the court for the 
following relief: For an order modifying the decree of divorce to award Mr. Ranson 
alimony in the amount of $2,400 per month. This is the amount that would equalize the 
parties' incomes at the level Mr. Ranson can actually earn. It would not equalize their 
total receipts due to the benefits Ms. Di Paolo receives. 
Failing this: 
For an order for a New Trial so that Mr. Ranson can present an affirmative case on 
his own behalf which would include: Testimony from a physician who has treated Mr. 
Ranson for ocular migraine and the entry of Mr. Ranson's medical records; Testimony 
from an employment counselor employed by Mr. Ranson and the entry of the records of 
Mr. Ranson earnings history; Mr. Ranson's statement of his actual expenses during 
marriage; 
In its order for New Trial this court should require the trial court to make findings 
as to: Mr. Ranson's need for retirement; The standard of living during marriage and the 
need to equalize standards of living after divorce; Mr. Ranson's contributions to Ms. Di 
Paolo's earning ability; Ms. Di Paolo's current income; The effect of taxes on Mr. 
Ranson's ability to meet his needs, as well as other pertinent issues. 
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If, against the law and the facts, this comt chooses to sustain the trial court's 
deeply flawed verdict it should, at the least, enter an order awarding Mr. Ranson 
the marriage, to correct the plain error of the trial court in failing to allow for the effect 
of taxes on Mr. Ranson's ability to meet his needs. 
• There is absoh itely no grounds for sustaining the ci irrent decree & hich has no 
basis in law or fact. 
DATED this 12th day of February, 2007. • 
Kenneth Clark Ranson 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of February, 2007,1 caused to be delivered by first 
class mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following: 
Robert De\ in Pusey 
140 West 9000 South, #7 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Kenneth Clark Ranson 
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ADDENDUM A 
'^wpiiuMWI ** I 
Divorce 
Case for Trial 
Alimony 
Method 
Establish Marianna's income. 
Establish my income. 
Establish our needs. 
Demonstrate that our joint current needs are greater than our joint income 
and that my needs are greater than my income plus one half of Marianna's 
income and ask for income sharing. 
Marianna's Income 
Marianna absolutely refuses to produce her Dean's Salary letters or her 
Compensation Status forms for the last two years. She claims they are lost 
and the College can't give her copies. 
These forms show what she actually makes. The latter includes all of her 
benefits as well and shows her total compensation. She is desperate to keep 
us from seeing these, obviously because they show her making more income 
than she is reporting otherwise. 
Get copies of Dean's Salary letters and Compensation Status Forms for 
2004-2005 and 2003-2004."' 
My ln< nine 
1 cannot return to work as a carpenter because I have been out of the field for 
16 years and because of health problems. My physician will make an 
affidavit attesting that I cannot work as a carpenter or do any physically 
strenuous work. This will mean that I will have to work for entry level 
wages now and from now on, unless I can retrain in another professional 
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field. This is why I am going to college and why it makes sense for both me 
and Marianna that I be allowed to go to college. 
Do I need to see an employment counselor to establish what I can make or 
should I just take the most remunerative job I can qualify for? 
Get affidavit from Dr. Lewis Barton, 
See employment counselor?? 
Get Job. 
Expenses 
So far I have done all of the work on trying to determine our expenses while 
Marianna has taken our financial records and refuses to let me see them or 
provide information from them. 
I have worked on the principal that we should determine our expenses as 
they were during the marriage since I am entitled to spousal support that will 
allow me to maintain the lifestyle that we had during the marriage. 
I have done a breakdown of our expenses for 2002 and I have received 
additional information from Marianna, from records that I maintained and 
she stole after having me removed form the house under a protective order 
she later withdrew, that may be enough to let me determine the same 
expenses for 2003. I have not done this because it takes tens of hours of 
work and I did not know if we needed it. 
To the 2002 expense calculation I made we will have to add the new 
expenses we will have living separately, health insurance for me, rent for 
her, etc. We should also add the amount that we saved each year. These 
funds were for the most part not savings for the future but were in lieu of 
time purchase agreements for large items. Because we owned the house that 
I built we were able to put money in savings every month and then when we 
needed a large consumer item, a car, furniture, an expensive trip, we paid for 
it in cash. These "savings" then took the place in out budget that a car 
payment or installment payments take in the budgets of other people. 
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Am I right in thinking that if both Marianna" s needs and my needs living 
separately are greater than one half of her salary that this is grounds to ask 
the court to order income equalization alimony?? 
Do I need to calculate 2003 expenses and on what basis?? 
Dmsion iif Pi oprrly 
House 
Marianna proposes that she take one half of the property that I brought to the 
marriage, the house that I built and paid for, the large gains form 
investments that I researched and followed, but that I not receive a share of 
the value of her career which she could not have had without my saving her 
job and researching her articles, not to mention taking care of the house and 
Sean. 
I can demonstrate that I contributed most of the money and all of the work to 
choose the location, buy the lot, design and build our house. Of the money 
used to build the house 37,000 was a gift from my parents which they gave 
me in place of any money they might have contributed to my college 
education. It was never their intention or my intention that Marianna be 
gifted with this money. It has always been my separate property which was 
invested in the house. My records show that I always accounted for this 
money separately. It was never commingled with or exchanged for any 
other asset. Now that I have to return to school and get a college education 
it is only fair that I receive this money back. 
Repairs 
The house needs extensive repairs. There is nothing unusual about this. We 
have lived in it almost 17 years and raised our family there and it is at the 
end of a wear cycle. Houses often need extensive repairs or remodeling at 
this stage. Also I have not been able to keep up with the repairs I would 
normally make because I had health problems every year for the three years 
previous to this one. My medical records will document this. 
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Marianna wants the house sold without repairs so that my share of our estate 
will be reduced. While this will reduce her receipts also she is wiling to do 
this to revenge herself on me. She knows that she can easily get more 
money through her career and that I cannot. 
House to be deeded to Ken 
It would be reasonable for Marianna to deed the house to me. She can be 
fully compensated by receiving a larger share of her retirement funds. In 
this way I could make the repairs to the house which I built and paid for and 
which is really an asset I brought to the marriage and Marianna would keep 
more of her retirement. This would allow us to separate our affairs 
completely and would prevent arguments, recriminations, and lawsuits over 
who was making the repairs, whether they were being done fast enough and 
in the right way, etc. 
Primary Care Giver/Use of the House 
Regardless of how the house is disposed of on a permanent basis I should 
receive the use of the house until Sean graduates from high school. I have 
always been his primary care giver, delaying my career and staying home 
with him. It is in his best interests that we continue this relationship until he 
goes to college which will occur in one and a half years from now. It would 
be very hard on him to have to adjust to a completely new living 
arrangement for that period. Sean agrees with this and wants to stay in his 
home. 
Get an affidavit from my mother concerning the nature and purpose of her 
gift-
Get from Marianna my file marked Lot Purchase-Parkcrest Number 4 and its 
contents. I need this to finish documenting the source of funds used to 
construct the house. 
Have house appraised as to its current value. Get Marianna to agree to pay 
for half of this 
5 
Other Monetary Assets 
Our other monetary assets, Marianna's retirement after an offset for the 
house, and our stock account, should be divided equally between us. Their 
value can be easily determined because it is published every weekday in 
dollars. 
Personal Property 
After having me removed from the home with a false protective order which 
she withdrew as soon as I responded to it Marianna helped herself to all of 
the newest and most valuable personal property including a new car, the 
artwork and all of the new furniture and left me with old broken almost 
worthless items. 
This is not fair. 
All of the personal property in possession of both of us should be seen by us 
both and marital property inventoried and valued by an appraiser. We 
should then divide this property with each party receiving an equal dollar 
amount. 
l-r\x7£*-rkTr\rx7 o n / 1 o n r > r o i c a n A f C A n o l rvrrvrv^t-f-1!7 IV / fo f ionmo tr\ n o u Kol-F 
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Details of child custody 
There are some real problems with our current child custody arrangement. 
Sean is falling asleep in class because Marianna lets him stay up all night on 
Friday and Saturday nights when he is in her custody. As nearly as I can tell 
he does not do any work when he is with her. We need to agree on a 
schedule for him that allows him to get enough sleep and under which he 
does some school work every day. 
We need to agree to a vacation schedule that will allow both parents to take 
longer trips with Sean. Ken has always done this with him and these are an 
important part of Sean's education. 
6 
Other Issues 
Return of my financial records. 
I need copies of all of the files that I maintained and which Marianna 
removed from the house when I was not permitted to be there because of her 
phony protective order claim. 
Christmas schedule 
I would like to make an agreement that would divide Sean's time during the 
Christmas holidays so that we could each take him to our respective homes 
for Christmas. 
AttAtM hi 
Estimate of expenses from 25/FEB/05 using 2002 figures 
Needs to be updated from current actuals were applicable 
Table 2 
Petitioner's Expenses based on actual 2002 expenses and addtions due to divorce 
Actual expenses have been divided by 2 to reflect expenses for Petitioner and Sean living at home half time. 
The value of the parties actual accumulations in lieu of installment payments has been added. 
An amount for health insurance for Petitioner has been added. 
Category Total 
Groceries 
Restaurant 
Auto 
Travel 
Utilities 
Clothes 
Home Repairs 
Medical, Drugs, and Grooming 
Miscellaneous (wine, Sean's toys and activities, gifts, pets) 
Mobile Phones 
Household Items 
Books and Office 
Entertainment 
Insurance 
Honda 75 
Ramcharger 44 
Homeowner's 46 
Health Insurance 
Accumulations in lieu of car, appliance, and furniture payments 
Cash 
Marianna's uncategorized checks 
329 
231 
123 
185 
308 
106 
86 
135 
113 
40 
40 
46 
37 
165 
450 
596 
23 
275 
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a schedule where one parent would have every Mon and Tues; the other 
parent would have every Wed and Thur; and then you all would alternate 
every other Fri, Sat and Sun - which again gives you both weekend time 
and the ability to take extended 3 or 4 day weekend trips. Think about 
this one as it has the potential to avoid a lot of problems. 
4. Finally, Marianna appears to still be stuck on the money you spent 
in the early days/weeks of your separation. Specifically, she believes 
your squandered up to $15,000 in 6 weeks and she wants you to have to 
bear the burden of these expenses. I indicated that you all were still 
married and that these are marital debts that you should equally bear. 
Robert and Marianna view it differently. Given the waste of time, 
money, and emotional energy this issue will no doubt command, I suggest 
we propose that (once more with the exception of the art/baskets which 
should remain on the table) you waive your concern over the monetary 
difference in the present personal property division, in exchange for 
Marianna waiving this claim. They have approximate = equal values. 
Further, much mileage and good faith can come from such a compromise. 
So, while we did not reach any answers, Robert and I did script out 
further discussions. Per Robert, Marianna remains open to continuing in 
mediation - with counsel only. Marcie has tentatively set aside April 
20 at 1:00 for a further meeting. Please review this stuff and get back 
with me. 
At the end of it all, it is quite clear that you all are in a power 
struggle, whereby Marianna wants more control over parenting and parent 
time (an area where you have traditionally dominated) and you want more 
equality and control over income and money (an area that Marianna has 
controlled). I hope we can resolve many or most of your issues, but am 
not convinced mediation is the only way to accomplish this. I^  believe^ 
room stilt remains for you and I to finalize a written response ta 
Marianna's written proposal and see where that takes us. It would be 
more time and cost-efficient and if we act quickly, we can get out a 
proposal before Aprif 20 - which could avoid that meeting or make it 
much more productive. 
Let me know your thoughts. 
Bridget K. Romano, Esq. 
Kruse Landa Maycock & Ricks, LLC 
The information contained in this e-mail message is legally privileged 
and/or confidential information intended only for the receipt by and use 
of the individual or entity to whom or which it is addressed. If you 
are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any 
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly 
" " f $ W r*Y/r i '§ * 
From: "Bridget Romano" <bromano@klmrlaw.com> 
Subject: Your Case 
Date: July 18, 2005 2:51:48 PM MDT 
To: <kennethranson@earthlink.net> 
Ken, 
I will be turning up the heat on trial prep in the coming days. Please let me know whether there have been 
any new developments I should be aware of. Also, please let me know if you've decided upon any terms 
that I am authorized to put forward in the hopes we may reach a settlement in this matter. 
I have notes of the proposals we have tossed about, but have never made. It is often the case that as a 
trial looms large, cases which appeared stuck in the mud somehow get jump-started once more. 
Also, let me know the status of your present employment. 
Bridget K. Romano, Esq. 
Kruse Landa Maycock & Ricks, LLC 
The information contained in this e-mail message is legally privileged and/or confidential information 
intended only for the receipt by and use of the individual or entity to whom or which it is addressed. If you 
are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of 
this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please immediately notify us 
by telephone and delete this message from your computer. Thank you. 
fl/juyw? tr* 
From: bromano@klmrlaw.com 
Subject: Re: Bit of good news 
Date: August 4, 2005 9:30:08 AM MDT 
To: kennethranson@earthlink.net 
Ken, 
The problem respecting the admissibility of your medical information is 
not simply Dr. Barton's reluctance. It is also a factor of my not 
knowing of the additional information you are now providing before this 
week. 
Had I known you were recently seen at the ER for a complex migraine or 
that you had completed a neurological workup with a physician other than 
Dr. Barton, we could have identified this information on your witness 
and exhibit lists. While I can submit amended lists setting out new 
names and information, given the late date, Robert Pusey has every right 
to object and it would clearly be within the judge's discretion to 
sustain that objection. Furthermore, it gives the newly identified 
medical providers very little notice. 
You've only talked about Dr. Barton up to this point and I have always 
understood he was the doc who diagnosed and who actively managed your 
migraines. This appears not to be the case and thus we are in a box, so 
to speak. Dr. Barton believes he made the limitations of his knowledge 
of ocular migraines clear in March. He also believes he made it clear 
he was not able to provide you with the type of information you were 
seeking to rebut a claim that you are malingering and are indeed 
employable. I do not know what happened during your consultation in 
March. I only have your account * that Dr. Barton was getting cold 
feet b/c he treats both you and Marianna and is loathe to go to court 
* and Dr. Barton's recollection and sparse medical record. Dr. 
Barton indicates he did not contact me earlier, as HIPPA prevents him 
from doing so. He called this week only b/c he was compelled by my 
subpoena to do so. 
I realize it is frustrating to you that we cannot simply submit records 
or complex affidavits. However, due process dictates that Marianna 
receive notice and an opportunity to confront proposed testimony. She 
cannot cross examine medical records or an affidavit any more than I can 
* and it is for this reason I have objected to Marianna's intent to 
introduce her own medical records without also calling as a witness the 
doctor who prepared these records. 
You may certainly testify about your lengthy history, your 
understanding or your diagnoses, and of the debilitating impact of your 
migraines. 
Quite frankly, the most important witnesses in most divorce cases are 
the parties. Further, many trial are conducted with only the Petitioner 
and Respondent providing testimony. 
Your medical history is relevant, but it is not the lynch-pin. You 
have not been certified as disabled; you have not applied for or been 
granted SSI benefits; and your migraines do not render you unemployable 
per se. The real use of your medical history is tp rule out a job in 
construction. This testimony and evidence in my opinion, however, is 
simply gravy. I believe your age, the fact you have not worked in 
construction (or any trade) for 20 years, and your present enrollment in 
college do more to advance your claims respecting your limited 
employability than the fact of ocular migraines. Additionally, I 
suspect Judge Fratto is not really going to assume you should put on a 
tool belt and start swinging a hammer. 
As I have indicated, focusing unduly upon your migraines is a risky 
proposition in view the fact you still hold a valid driver's license; 
you operate a vehicle w/ no apparent restrictions; and you frequently 
transport your son. Likewise, your migraine condition does not stand 
in the way of your pursuing a degree or in meeting your academic 
requirements. If we attempt to drive home over and again the blinding 
and limiting effect of ocular migraine, you unintentionally and 
unwittingly put your judgement respecting Sean and his safety before the 
court, and, you risk looking foolish given your other intended testimony 
respecting the sheer number of hours you spend reading and preparing for 
class and the fact of your excellent marks. 
I have still not seen Kristy Farnsworth's report respecting her view of 
your employment options. I have asked for it 2x. Accordingly, on 
Monday I filed a motion asking the court to exclude this report b/c you 
and I have been denied the opportunity to review and rebut the report. 
I will be in touch today with any questions and I will let you know if 
I talk further with Dr. Barton or with the UTs General Counsel. 
Bridget K. Romano, Esq. 
Kruse Landa Maycock & Ricks, LLC 
The information contained in this e-mail message is legally privileged 
and/or confidential information intended only for the receipt by and use 
of the individual or entity to whom or which it is addressed. If you 
are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any 
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly 
prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please 
immediately notify us by telephone and delete this message from your 
computer. Thank you. 
Kenneth Ranson <kennethranson@earthlink.net> 8/3/2005 4:53 PM > » 
Bridget 
Well all of that seems perfectly reasonable. 
What I cannot believe is that because one physician does not like to go 
to court that my entire medical history is inadmissible. There must be 
some way around this. (Just as a side note I had to close my eyes five 
times while writing that last sentence.) 
On 5/MAY/05 I went to the University Hospital emergency room for 
numbness on the entire right side of my body. The resident neurologist 
who treated me was, 
Dr. Jean Louis 
University of Utah Neurology Department 
581-2121 
His supervising physician was apparently 
Dr. M. Scott Lindscott 
The emergency room physician who saw me was 
Dr. Deane Long 
Her supervisor was apparently 
Dr. Alan Condie 
They ordered an MRI to rule out stroke and arrived at a diagnosis of 
complex migraine. 
/HWWf * v 
"Bridget Romano" <bromano@klmrlaw.com> 
COBRA policy 
August 12, 2005 10:19:41 AM MDT 
<kennethranson@earthlink.net> 
Ken, 
Please contact the U of U benefits office to get a letter or written 
statement verifying the info you received over the phone respecting 
COBRA coverage. 
I have called, they cannot release info to me. 
I looks like you talked to Thauna Kazakevicius, who told you the total 
premium for med and dent would be $454.63 and med only would be $418.51. 
We will plug those numbers into an updated expense schedule, but would 
be wise to have written support. 
Also, in the event we are going to trial and Dr. Farnsworth testifies, 
please contact the profs you have referred to so I may talk with them 
about your ptotntial for being accepted to grad school. 
Alternatively, if trial is going and if only to streamline matters, I 
propose we agree to stipulate that you can earn $10.00 per hour or 
$20,800 per year. 
And, I have just received your email and I will be in touch. 
I am scrambling with the rest of the exhibits today * which I had put 
on hold and which need to be copied and delievered to Pusey and the 
court if we are a go. 
Bridget K. Romano, Esq. 
Kruse Landa Maycock & Ricks, LLC 
The information contained in this e-mail message is legally privileged 
and/or confidential information intended only for the receipt by and use 
of the individual or entity to whom or which it is addressed. If you 
are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any 
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly 
prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please 
immediately notify us by telephone and delete this message from your 
computer. Thank you. 
Help Us Keep Your Earnings Record Accurate 
You, your employer and Social Security share 
responsibility for the accuracy of your earnings record. 
Since you began working, we recorded your reported 
earnings under your name and Social Security number. 
We have updated your record each time your employer (or 
you, if you're self-employed) reported your earnings. 
Remember, it's your earnings, not the amount of taxes 
you paid or the number of credits you've earned, that 
determine your benefit amount When we figure that 
amount, we base it on your average earnings over your 
lifetime. If our records are wrong, you may not receive 
all the benefits to which you are entitled. 
T Review this chart carefully using your own records 
to make sure our information is correct and that 
we've recorded each year you worked. You're the only 
person who can look at the earnings chart and know 
whether it is complete. 
-Some or all of^eur-gamings4ramJ^ 
be shown on your Statement It could be that we 
were still processing last year's earnings reports 
when your Statement was prepared. Your complete 
earnings for last year will be shown on next year's 
Statement Note: If you worked for more than 
one employer during any year, or if you had both 
earnings and self-employment income, we combined 
your earnings for the year. 
r
 There's a limit on the amount of earnings on which 
you pay Social Security taxes each year. The limit 
increases yearly. Only the maximum taxable amount 
will appear on your earnings chart. (For Medicare 
taxes, the maximum earnings amount began rising 
in 1991. Since 1994, all of your earnings are taxed for 
Medicare.) 
r
 Call us right amy at 1-800-772-1213 (7 a.m.-7 p.m.) 
if any earnings for years before last year are shown 
incorrectly. If possible, have vour W-2 or tax return 
for those years handy. (If you live outside the U.S., 
follow the directions at the bottom of Page 4.) 
Your Earnings Record at a Glance -
Your Taxed 
Years You 
Worked 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
198£_ 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Social Security 
Bapijngc 
$ 2,494 $ 
1,329 
3,921 
2,674 
8,553 
2,900 
5,288 
4,364 
470 
310 
0 
0 
0 
192 
0 
0 
JL 
0 
0 
0 
Your Taxed 
Medicare 
Earnings 
2,494 
1,329 
3,921 
2,674 
8,553 
2,900 
5,288 
4,364 
470 
310 
0 
0 
0 
192 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Years You 
Worked 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
Your Taxed 
Social Security 
Earnings 
$ 0 $ 
0 
0 
0 
887 
1375 
0 
1,071 
677 
0 
0 
0 
Your Taxed 
Medicare 
Earnings 
0 
0 
0 
0 
887 
1,375 
0 
1,071 
677 
0 
0 
0 
2002 Notyetrecorded-
Totals over your working careen 
Estimated taxes paid for Social Security: 
You paid: $2,059 
Your employers paid: $1,565 
Estimated taxes paid for Medicare: 
You paid: $381 
Your employers paid: $267 
Note: If you are self-employed, you pay the total tax on your net earnings. 
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ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY #2665 
Attorney for Respondent 
Bank of the West Building 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 7 
Sandy, Utah 84070-2033 
Telephone: (801) 566-9286 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
KENNETH CLARK RANSON, * MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITON 
Petitioner, * TO PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
vs. * 
MARIANNA DIPAOLO, * Civil No. 044900818 DA 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Respondent. * Comm. T. Patrick Casey 
COMES NOW the Respondent above-named, by and through counsel, and hereby offer 
ner memorandum of points & authorities in opposition to Petitioner's Motion for New Trial as 
Follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Prior to commencing trial of this divorce action, the parties stipulated to a 
resolution of all issues save two, to wit: Petitioner's claim for alimony and Petitioner's claim for a 
pre-marital share in the marital residence. 
2. The Court then convened for trial to hear evidence regarding the two reserved 
1 
issues on August 16th, 17th, 25th and 29th, 2005. During trial both parties were called to offer 
direct testimony in support of their claims and defenses, and each party was extensively cross-
examined by opposing counsel. An expert witness was also called by Respondent and subjected 
to extensive cross-examination. Also in furtherance of the case the Court received thirty exhibits 
into evidence, at least 23 offered by Petitioner. 
3. At the conclusion of the four-day trial, the Court rendered its findings, 
conclusions and ruling from the bench. 
4. By his pro se pleadings Petitioner apparently seeks a new trial, and as authority 
bffers Rule 59, U.R.C.P. 
POINT I 
RULE 59, U.R.C.P., DOES NOT AFFORD A 
LEGAL BASIS FOR PETITIONER TO REQUEST 
A NEW TRIAL IN THIS CASE 
5. Rule 59, U.R.C.P, provides in relevant part as follows: 
Rule 59. New trials; amendment of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may 
be granted to all or any of they parties and on all or part of the issues, for 
any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for new 
trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if 
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact 
and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment: 
2 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse 
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either 
party was prevented from having a fair trial;. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not 
have guarded against; 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making 
the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produce 
6. The relief requested by petitioner is not supported by the rule. 
a. Irregularity in the proceedings. 
7. First under the rule, a party can only seek a new trial based upon an irregularity 
arising from anyone other than themselves (the Court's conduct, ruling or abuse of discretion, or 
jhe conduct of the opposing party or the jury). Thus Rule 59(a)(1) does not support the request 
ror relief. 
b. Accident or surprise. 
8. Next, under the rule a new trial may be granted upon a theory of accident or 
surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Yet according to Plaintiffs 
pleadings he anticipated each issue that would be presented at trial, and was apprised of the 
evidence supporting Respondent's case. Thus, a new trial cannot be granted on a theory of 
accident or surprise. 
c. Newly discovered evidence. 
3 
9. Next, a new trial may also be warranted on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence. Petitioner now postulates three now-considered deficiencies in his case: (1) an absence 
of medical testimony; (2) an absence of medical records; and (3) an absence of employment-
related testimony. 
I 10. However, these deficiencies cannot be considered newly discovered evidence 
> because such a claim requires three elements: First, it must be material, competent evidence 
which is in fact newly discovered. Second, it must be such that it could not, by due diligence, 
nave been discovered and produced at trial. Finally, it must not be merely cumulative or 
incidental, but must be of sufficient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it 
there would have been a different result. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 2.d 832,841 (Utah 
1984) In this case a claim of newly discovered evidence cannot be supported by the facts. 
11. First, each of these issues were known to Petitioner in advance of trial as admitted 
In his affidavit and supporting exhibits. 
12. Second, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he exercised due diligence in 
developing this information. While Petitioner lays blame on his former counsel, his pleadings 
and the exhibits attached thereto amply illustrate that he personally active in his case and at some 
points steering it, that he was given the information required to develop such evidence but 
apparently failed to do so. For instance, Petitioner was given every opportunity to seek an expert 
relative to his vocational status, Saara Grizell, but chose not to do so. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 
4 
JV16 attached to his affidavit) Indeed, even Petitioner's personal physician was unwilling to 
testify that Petitioner was not malingering, nor that he was unable to work. (See Petitioner's 
Exhibit A-17 attached to his affidavit) 
13. Third and finally, to assert a claim of newly discovered evidence Petitioner must 
be able to establish that the then-missing evidence is now in existence, but he has failed to do so. 
The evidence that Petitioner proposes he may offer is merely speculative at this time, and does 
not currently exist to support his motion. See In the interest of S.R & B.R, 735 P.2d 53 (Utah 
Q987) 
14. For the foregoing reasons Petitioner's request for relief under Rule 59 is not well 
taken and should be denied. 
POINT 11 
PETITIONERS REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL 
ON THE BASIS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE LAW OR THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
15. The general theme of Petitioner's Motion for New Trail sounds on a theory of 
'ineffective assistance of counsel." No such basis exists to seek a new trial in a civil matter. 
16. Contrary to Petitioner's representations regarding Maltby v. Cox Construction, 
Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979), in that case the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: 
"And while incompetence of counsel may be a ground for granting a new triaWn a 
5 
criminal case where the defendant's life and liberty are at stake, this Court'has never, to 
our knowledge, granted a new trial on such a ground in a civil action. I would adopt the 
position of the Oklahoma Supreme Court as stated in the case of Wilson v. Sherman, 461 
P.2d 606 (1969): 
"While perhaps as an abstract proposition of law it may be possible to 
grant a new trial in civil litigation upon the ground that one of the parties was 
prevented from having a fair trial because of alleged negligence on the part of his 
attorney, we know of no such rule having been recognized in this or any other 
jurisdiction for that matter. Defendants cite no cases. Furthermore, it would seem 
unfair and harsh to thus penalize the other side in the litigation by requiring him to 
again present his cause to another jury at a new trial." 
As criminal matters, the cases of Strickland v. Washington and State v. Lopez cited by Petitioner 
ire clearly distinguishable from this matter. 
17. Moreover, the record is replete with the zealous, professional efforts of 
Petitioner's counsel in all aspects of trial in this action. Plaintiffs other complaints related to 
counsel's performance regarding settlement offers, proposals, pre-trial settlement and the like are 
likewise not true, and additionally they are irrelevant to trial performance. 
18. For the foregoing reasons Petitioner's request for relief under a theory of 
•[incompetent counsel" is not supported by the law or the facts of this case, and should therefore 
pe denied. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent respectfully prays the Court for the following relief: 
1. To dismiss Petitioner's Motion for New Trial, that Petitioner take nothing thereby; 
6 
2. For an award of her reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred to respond to the 
^notion in an amount to be established by affidavit; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem fair and proper in the 
premises. 
DATED this w day of March, 2006. 
ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for New Trial by first class mail, postage 
(prepaid, this / O day of March, 2006, to: 
KENNETH C. RANSON 
Petitioner Pro Se 
2096 E. 10095 Sojtfh 
Sandy,, 
KENNETH CLARK RANSON MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 044900818 
V. Judge Fratto 
MARIANNA DEPAOLO 
The matter is before the court to consider petitioner's Motion for New Trial. Petitioner 
argues that he is entitled to a new trial because his attorney was ineffective. 
The legal concept of ineffective assistance of counsel, as a basis to either reverse a 
decision or mandate a new trial, is applicable only in criminal cases. If the court was persuaded 
that the proceedings (including the conduct of petitioner's counsel) had resulted in an "injustice," 
appropriate remedial action could be taken, including granting a new trial. Petitioner, however, 
has failed to demonstrate that an injustice has occurred in this case. 
Petitioner has alleged that his lawyer failed to present certain evidence. There has been no 
showing that such evidence exists, it could have been presented at the trial and the decision 
would have been different after the court's consideration of this evidence. 
Accordingly, the motion is denied. 
This minute entry constitutes the order regarding the matters addressed herein. No further 
order is required. 
ADDENDUM C 
RANSON v. Pi PAOLO 
Civil No. 044900818 DA 
ANALYSIS OF PETITIONER'S INCOME 
Annual income identified by Dr. Farnsworth - $32,864.00 
Annual fcdeial tax identified by Diane Castell - 3,381.00 
Annual state tax identified by Diane Castell - 1,559.00 
Annual F1CA tax identified by Diane Castell - 2,038.00 
Annual medicare tax identified by Diane Castell - 477.00 
GROSS MONTHLY INCOME: $2,738.67 
Federal tax (281.75) 
State tax (129.92) 
FICA (16983) 
Medicare (39.75) 
NET MONTHLY INCOME: $2,117.42 
E*trade account $180,000 Sean Kenneth Marianna 
Schooling (15,000) $15,000 
Equalize autos (5,265) $5,265 
One-halfremainder (79,867.50) $79,867.50 
One-half remainder (79,867.50) $79,867 50 
TOTALS: -0- $15,000 $85,132.50 $79,867.50 
RANSON v. DiPAOLO 
Case No. 044900818 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
PETITIONER'S MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Rent or mortgage payments 1 
Real property taxes (residence) (current actual amount) 1 
Real property insurance (residence) 
Maintenance (residence) 
Food and household supplies 
Restaurant and eating out 
Utilities: 
Electricity 
Natural gas 
Water and Garbage 
Sewer 
Cable Television 
1 Internet 
1 Telephone: Home; Cellular; Long Distance 
1 Clothing, laundry & dry cleaning (Ken and Sean) 
1 Medical, drugs and grooming 
1 Dental expenses 
1 Insurance - Medical/Dental Ins. Premium for Kenneth 
1 Insurance - Auto 
[ School - Sean's Tuition/Expenses 
1 School - Kenneth's tuition and expenses 
1 Entertainment 
1 Health Club Membership 
Loan Repayment: Rose Ranson 
1 Travel 
1 Auto expense (gas / repairs & maintenance) 
1 Auto payments 
1 Legal Fees 
1 Misc. Cash Expenses 
I Other: Wine, Sean's toys and activities, gifts, pets 
1 Books; Office Supplies; Postage 
1 TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES: 
$ 0 | 
114 
43 
50 
394 
253 
45 J 
66 
58 
4 
41 
41 
134 
50 
191 
0 
455 
74 
1 ^ 2 5 J 
313 
50 1 X 
680 1 
100 
280 
0 
450 
85 
133 
37 
1 $4,800 
4 
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Income equalization alimony assumiing different levels of income for Kenneth Ranson 
Assume Mr. Ranson can earn the amount accepted by the trial court, $32,000 per year 
Marianna 
77000 Gross Income 
Federal Income Tax 
0 Alimony 
77000 Adjusted Gross Income 
6200 2 exemptions 
4850 standard deduction 
65950 Federal Taxable Income 
13231 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single 
Utah Income Tax 
77000 Adjusted Gross Income 
4650 2 exemptions 
4850 standard deduction 
6615.5 1/2 federal tax 
60884.5 Utah Taxable Income 
4141 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single 
59628 Marianna's Net Income After Taxes 
Assume alimony of $1900 per month 
Marianna 
77000 Gross Income 
Federal Income Tax 
22800 Alimony 
54200 Adjusted Gross Income 
6230 2 exemptions 
4850 standard deduction 
43150 Federal Taxable Income 
7519 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single 
Utah Income Tax 
54200 Adjusted Gross Income 
4650 2 exemptions 
Ken 
Ken 
32000 Gross Income 
Federal Income Tax 
32000 Adjusted Gross Income 
3100 1 exemption 
4850 standard deduction 
24050 Federal Taxable Income 
3246 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single 
Utah Income Tax 
32000 Adjusted Gross Income 
2325 1 exemption 
4850 standard deduction 
1623 1/2 federal tax 
23202 Utah Taxable Income 
1503 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single 
27251 Ken's Net Income After Taxes 
54800 Gross Income 
Federal Income Tax 
54800 Adjusted Gross Income 
3100 1 exemption 
4850 standard deduction 
46850 Federal Taxable Income 
8444 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single 
Utah Income Tax 
54800 Adjusted Gross Income 
2325 1 exemption 
Alimony-AB 
4850 standard deduction 
3759.5 1/2 federal tax 
40940.5 Utah Taxable Income 
2745 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single 
43936 Marianna's Net Income After Taxes 
4850 standard deduction 
4222 1/2 federal tax 
43403 Utah Taxable Income 
2918 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single 
43438 Ken's Net Income After Taxes 
Marianna's income will be 498 greater than Ken's 
Effects of Medical Expenses and Benefits 
Marianna's Benefits 
as percentage of salary 
Retirement 
Medical Insurance 
Dental Insurance 
Life Insurance 
Disability Insurance 
Total Benefits as percent 
Total cash value 
14.2 
8.4 
0.87 
0.17 
0.07 
23.71 
18257 
Marianna's total compensation 62193 
AFTER taxes AND benefits 
Amount Marianna's total compensation including benefits is greater 
than Ken's disposable income after health insurance. 
Alimony-AB 
Ken's premium to continue current level of health insurance 
COBRA premium per month 455 
Annual total 5460 
Ken's disposable Income after 37978 
health insurance 
24215 
Assume Mr. Ranson can earn his actual earnings, $10 per hour 
Marlanna 
77000 Gross Income 
Federal Income Tax 
0 Alimony 
77000 Adjusted Gross Income 
6200 2 exemptions 
4850 standard deduction 
65950 Federal Taxable Income 
13231 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single 
Utah Income Tax 
77000 Adjusted Gross Income 
4650 2 exemptions 
4850 standard deduction 
6615.5 1/2 federal tax 
60884.5 Utah Taxable Income 
4141 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single 
59628 Marlanna's Net Income After Taxes 
Assume alimony of $2400 per month 
Marlanna 
77000 Gross Income 
Federal Income Tax 
28800 Alimony 
48200 Adjusted Gross Income 
6200 2 exemptions 
4850 standard deduction 
37150 Federal Taxable Income 
6019 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single 
Utah Income Tax 
48200 Adjusted Gross Income 
4650 2 exemptions 
4850 standard deduction 
Allmony-AB Page 4 
$20,800 per year 
Ken 
Ken 
20800 Gross Income 
Federal Income Tax 
20800 Adjusted Gross Income 
3100 1 exemption 
4850 standard deduction 
12850 Federal Taxable Income 
1574 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single 
Utah Income Tax 
20800 Adjusted Gross Income 
2325 1 exemption 
4850 standard deduction 
787 1/2 federal tax 
12838 Utah Taxable Income 
778 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single 
18448 Ken's Net Income After Taxes 
49600 Gross Income 
Federal Income Tax 
49600 Adjusted Gross Income 
3100 1 exemption 
4850 standard deduction 
41650 Federal Taxable Income 
7156 Tax from IRS Schedule X 2004 single 
Utah Income Tax 
49600 Adjusted Gross Income 
2325 1 exemption 
4850 standard deduction 
3009.5 1/2 federal tax 
35690.5 Utah Taxable Income 
2377 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single 
39804 Marianna's Net Income After Taxes 
Marianna's Income will be -42 greater than Ken's 
Alimony-AB Page 5 
3578 1/2 federal tax 
38847 Utah Taxable Income 
2598 Tax from Utah Worksheet A 2004 Single 
39846 Ken's Net Income After Taxes 
ADDENDUM H 
/ iimruw tl' 
ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYABILITY 
For 
Kenneth Ranson 
Prepared by 
Kristy Famsworth, Ph.D. 
FARNSWORTH & ASSOCIATES 
9557 South 700 East, #100 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801)572-5633 
& 
* 
arnsworth Kristy Farnsworth, Ph.D., P.C. 
&. Associates CRC, CVE, CDMS, DABVE Rehabilitationist 
Life Care Planner 
Psychologist" 
(Idaho Licensure) 
ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYABILITY 
CLIENT: Kenneth Ranson 
REFERRED BY: 
EVALUATED BY: 
DATE: 
Robert D. Pusey, Esq. 
Kristy Farnsworth, Ph.D. 
Vocational Specialist 
August 2, 2005 
I have had an opportunity to complete a labor market survey and analysis of 
employability based upon information provided by Ms. DiPaolo for Mr. Kenneth Ranson. 
It is my opinion that Mr. Ranson's starting salary would be expected to range from 
$19,760 up to $32,864. 
CURRENT VOCATIONAL OPTIONS 
1. Obtain employment as a Customer Service Representative at a starting 
salary of $19,760. 
2. Return to work as a Finish Carpenter or Bench Carpenter with annual 
earnings ranging from $24.336 up to $33.696. 
3. Employment a as First-Line Supervisor/Manager of Construction Trades 
Workers with entry level wage of $32.864 up to $45,136. 
4. Complete short-term training in Construction Management or General 
Contracting for increased earning potential. 
9557 South 700 East Suite 100 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
(801) 572-5633 
kfar@xmission.com 
fax (801) 545-9422 
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METHODOLOGY 
The following steps were completed to determine Mr. Ranson's employability: 
1. Interview with Mrs. DiPaolo to obtain background information 
2. Identification of Mr. Ranson's skills and abilities 
3. Identification of jobs where skills and abilities could be used 
4. Identification of the annual number of job openings 
5. Identification of current openings listed with the Department of Workforce 
Services 
6. Review of current classified ads in the Salt Lake Tribune. 
7. Identification of potential barriers to employment 
8. Establishment of capacity to produce income based on current skill level and 
job opportunities 
9. Estimation of annual earnings 
REFERRAL INFORMATION 
I was asked to performan an evaluation of employability and earning capacity for Mr. 
Kenneth Ranson. Due to the upcoming trial, I was not able to meet with Mr. Ranson 
personally, and relied on basic information provided by Mrs. DiPaolo. Using that 
information, I completed an analysis of his skills and abilities and research of the 
Wasatch Front labor market. 
INFORMATION PROVIDED 
Mr. Kenneth Ranson is a 54 year-old man who currently resides in Salt Lake City Utah. 
ACADEMICS 
Mr. Ranson graduated from high school in San Antonio Texas then attended vocational 
training in Carpentry. He completed the academic program and supervised work hours 
to obtain a Journeyman's License in the state of Texas. He attended one quarter of 
school at the University of Texas at Austin in 1978 in general studies and more recently, 
two semesters of coursework at the University of Utah. 
LICENSES/CERTIFICATIONS 
Mr. Ranson possesses a valid drivers' license. In addition, he obtained professional 
licensure/certifications as a Journeyman Carpenter in Texas and General Contractor in 
Utah. 
Journeyman Carpenter - status of license is unknown 
Utah General Contractor License (1985), status of license unknown 
VOCATIONAL HISTORY 
Mr. Ranson is not currently employed. General work history is as follows: 
Ranson, Kenneth 3 
Licensed Journeyman Carpenter beginning in 1974 He worked as a carpenter 
remodeling homes in Texas until 1982 when he relocated to Utah. 
1982-1986 self-employed Carpenter remodeling homes in the Salt Lake City 
area. 
Mr. Ranson obtained his General Contractor License in 1986. He drew plans, 
obtained permits, supervised subcontractors and completed much of the work on 
a personal residence, including most of the finish work. 
Since finishing the home, Mr. Ranson has written short stories and a novel, 
though none has been published. 
Volunteer activities: School building committee 
History and literature lecturer, grade and middle school 
MEDICAL HISTORY 
Mr. Ranson does not have any medical condition that would interfere with his ability to 
work. Current medications include Inderal for atypical headache, Trazodone to aid 
sleep, Allopurinol for gout and Zocor for high cholesterol. 
KNOWLEDGE. SKILLS AND ABILITIES 
Considering his vocational training and past work experience, Mr. Ranson has 
specialized knowledge in the following areas: 
• Building and Construction - Knowledge of materials, methods, and the tools 
involved in the construction or repair of houses, buildings, or other structures 
such as highways and roads. 
• Mechanical - Knowledge of machines and tools, including their designs, uses, 
repair, and maintenance. 
• Management of Financial Resources — Determining how money will be spent 
to get the work done, and accounting for these expenditures. 
• Building and Construction - Knowledge of materials, methods, and the 
appropriate tools to construct objects, structures, and buildings 
• Design - Knowledge of design techniques, principles, tools and instruments 
involved in the production and use of precision technical plans, blueprints, 
drawings, and models. 
Demonstrated skills include: 
• Equipment Selection - Determining the kind of tools and equipment needed to 
do a job. 
• Reading Comprehension - Understanding written sentences and paragraphs in 
work related documents. 
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Mathematics - Using mathematics to solve problems. 
Explosive Strength - The ability to use short bursts of muscle force to propel 
oneself (as in jumping or sprinting), or to throw an object. 
Information Ordering - The ability to arrange things or actions in a certain order 
or pattern according to a specific rule or set of rules (e.g., patterns of numbers, 
letters, words, pictures, mathematical operations). 
Static Strength - The ability to exert maximum muscle force to lift, push, pull, or 
carry objects. 
Control Precision - The ability to quickly and repeatedly adjust the controls of a 
machine or a vehicle to exact positions. 
Deductive Reasoning - The ability to apply general rules to specific problems to 
produce'answers that make sense. 
Manual Dexterity- The ability to quickly move your hand, your hand together 
with your arm, or your two hands to grasp, manipulate, or assemble objects. 
Wrist-Finger Speed- The ability to make fast, simple, repeated movements of 
the fingers, hands, and wrists. 
Inspecting Equipment, Structures, Material- Inspecting or diagnosing 
equipment, structures, or materials to identify the causes of errors or other 
problems or defects. 
Controlling Machines and Processes - Using either control mechanisms or 
direct physical activity to operate machines or processes (not including 
computers or vehicles). 
Evaluating Info. Against Standards - Evaluating information against a set of 
standards and verifying that it is correct. 
Estimating Needed Characteristics - Estimating the Characteristics of 
Materials, Products, Events, or Information: Estimating sizes, distances, and 
quantities, or determining time, costs, resources, or materials needed to perform 
a work activity. 
Judging Qualities of Things, Srvc, People - Making judgments about or 
assessing the value, importance, or quality of things or people. 
Identifying Objects, Actions, and Events - Identifying information received by 
making estimates or categorizations, recognizing differences or similarities, or 
sensing changes in circumstances or events. 
Implementing Ideas, Programs, etc. - Conducting or carrying out work 
procedures and activities in accord with one's own ideas or information provided 
through directions/instructions for purposes of installing, modifying, preparing, 
delivering, constructing, integrating, finishing, or completing programs, systems, 
structures, or products. 
• The ability to direct and coordinate the activities of staff and contract personnel, 
and evaluate their performance. 
• The ability to determine labor requirements and recruit workers 
• The ability to direct and supervise workers. 
• The ability to plan, organize, and direct activities concerned with the construction 
of structures and systems. 
• The ability to schedule the project in logical steps and budget time required to 
meet deadlines. 
• The ability to select, contract, and oversee workers who complete specific pieces 
of the project, such as painting or plumbing. 
In addition to these job skills, Mr. Ranson is computer literate and familiar with common 
computer programs and the internet. 
Examples of jobs where these skills, abilities and knowledge are used include: 
First-line supervisors/managers of construction trades and extraction workers 
Carpenters 
Cost Estimators 
Cabinetmakers and Bench Carpenters 
Customer Service Representatives 
Computer Support Specialists 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
Based on his demonstrated skills and abilities and transferable skills, possible job 
alternatives were identified. In addition, unskilled entry level jobs were considered. The 
Utah Non-Metro Occupational Outlook-Statewide and Service Delivery Areas 2002 -
2012 publication of the Utah Department of Workforce Services presents the official 
State of Utah projections of industry and occupational employment and provides labor 
market information in the form of labor demand, labor supply and occupational 
characteristics. Published in September 2004, this data relies on information gathered 
in 2003 wages. Relevant information for the IV 
JOB 
First-line supervisors/managers of 
construction trades and extraction workers 
Carpenters 
Cost Estimators 
Cabinetmakers and Bench Carpenters 
Construction Manager 
Customer Service Representative 
Computer Support Specialists 
ANNUAL 
OPENINGS 
240 
560 
80 
120 
150 
1130 
290 
letro areas in the state of Utah fc 
ENTRY 
WAGE 
$15.80 
$11.70 
$14 30 
$8.80 
$21 90 
$9.10 
$9.50 
ANNUAL 
WAGE 
AVERAGE 
WAGE 
$21.90 
$16.10 
$23.00 
$11.60 
$34.10 
$12.00 
$14.90 and 
)llows: 
ANNUAL I 
WAGE 
o 
Copies of the pages containing this data are provided in Section One. 
Other labor market information was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office 
of Employment Projections and Utah Department of Workforce Services related to 2003 
wages. The percentile rank distributions of wages in the state of Utah for these 
positions are as follows: 
Job 
First-line 
supervisors/ 
Managers 
Carpenters 
Cabinetmakers and 
Bench Carpenters 
Construction 
Managers 
Cost Estimators 
Customer 
Service Rep 
Computer Support 
Specialist 
Pay i 
Period 
Hourly 
Yearly 
Hourly 
Yearly 
Hourly 
Yearly 
Hourly 
Yearly 
' Hourly 
Yearly 
| Hourly 
Yearly 
1 Hourly 
Yearly 
2003 | 
10% 
$14.75; 
$30,700 
$10.63 
$22,100 
I $7.57 
$15,700 
$19.33 
$40,200 
| $13.04 
$27,100 
$8.37 
$17,400 
$9.47 
$19,700 
25% | 
$17.59 
$36,600 
$13 34 
$27,700 
$9.31 
$19,400 
$22.87 
$47,600 
i $16.88 
$35,100 
$10.19 
$21,200 
$10.65 
$22,200 
Median 
$20.75 
$43,200 
$16.30 
$33,900 
$10.78 
$22,400 
$29.89 
$62,200 
$21.92 
$45,600 
$12.79 
$26,600 
$13.36 
[_ $27,800 
75% | 90% | 
$25.26| 
$52,500 
$19.25 
$40,000 
$13.10; 
$27,200 
$40.14 
$83,500 
$29.56 
$61,500 
| $16.39 
$34,100 
| $18.58 
| _ $38,600 
$30.121 
$62,600 
$21.37 
$44,400 J 
$15.941 
$33,2001 
$48.261 
$100,4001 
I $37.15 j 
$77,3001 
$21.041 
$43,8001 
$24.36 
$50,700 
Wages specific to the Wasatch Front were studied. They are as follows: 
Salt Lake City - Ogden Area Wages 
Occupation Title Entry Wage AveraaelMedianl 
Middle 
First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Construction Trades and ^ Q.Q 
Extraction Workers ' 
i n Si7'?40 
45T280 
45,600 
Carpenters 
Cabinetmakers and Bench[Carpenters 
Construction Managers 
Cost Estimators 
Customer Service Representatives 
Computer Support Specialists 
,34,350 
18,740 
22,960 
33,330_ 
22,880 
71,200~ 
43,890 
1 
33^570" 
2T,650~ 
64,750 
37770 to 52640 
'28170 to 38670 
"19440 to24940" 
51900 to 83530 
50,390 46,490 "38340 to 60950 
25,140 23,500 20120 to 27980 
35,140 32,440 25330 to 42270 
Copies of the Occupational Reports for these jobs are provided in Section Two of this 
report. The reports contain a brief description, wage information, skills and an example 
of current job openings. 
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CURRENT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES: 
Examples of the current job openings listed with the Department of Workforce Services 
that are congruent with Mr. Ranson's demonstrated skills and abilities include: 
JOB TITLE 
Foreman/Lead Man 
Carpenter 
Remodeling Lead Carpenter 
Finish Carpenter 
Finish Carpenter 
Finish Carpenter 
Finish Carpenters 
Lead Carpenter 
Lead Carpenter 
Carpenter 
Finish Carpenters 
Lead Carpenter 
Experienced Finish Carpenter 
1 Skilled Carpenter 
Foreman/Lead Man 
Carpenter 
Foreman/Lead Man 
Lead Carpenter 
Estimator Purchaser 
Cabinet Makers 
Cabinet Makers 
Mill Worker 
Cabinet Maker 
Cabinet Maker 
Cabinet Makers/Woodworkers 
Cabinet Makers/Woodworkers 
Customer Service 
Customer Service Opportunities 
Technical Support 
Help Desk Specialist 
ANNUAL WAGE 1 
$17.30-18.50/per hour 
$17.30-18.50/perhour 
$16-17/per hour 
$15-15/per hour 
$13-19/per hour 
$13-15/per hour 
$13-13/per hour 
$12.50-17.50/perhour 
$12-20/perhour 
$12-20/perhour 
$12-15/per hour 
$12-15/per hour 
$12-15/per hour 
$12-15/per hour 
$16-19/per hour 
$16-18/per hour 
$19-22/perhour 
$13-15/per hour 
Not provided 
Not Provided 
Not Provided 
Not Provided 
$8-15/per hour 
$10-13/per hour 
$9-14/perhour 
$9-14/per hour 
i $10.00-$11.00 
i $9.00 
| $15.00-$30.00 
I $15.01 
Copies of these job orders are provided in Section Three. 
ADVERTISED JOB OPENINGS 
Current job openings compatible with Mr. Ranson's abilities were located in the 
classified ads of the recent Sunday Tribune. Examples of the employment opportunities 
include: 
JOB TITLE 
Building Inspector II 
Carpentry 
Cabinetry 
Cabinetry 
Cabinetry - Installer 
Cabinetry 
ADVERTISED WAGE 
$15.88-$22.19 
$16.00 
$9.50 
Not provided 
Not provided 
Not provided 
ENTRY WAGE* 
$11.80416.208 
$11.80-$16.208 
$8.50-$11.30* 
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Call Center 
Carpenter 
Carpenter 
Carpenter- Finish 
Technical Support Specialist 
Technical Support 
Computer Tech Support 
' Construction Superintendent 
Construction Project Manager 
Construction - Residential Remodel 
Construction - Remodeling 
Construction - Superintendent 
Customer Service 
Technical Customer Service 
Customer Service 
Customer Sen/ice 
Customer Service 
Customer Service - Trainee 
$9.00-$11.00 
Not provided 
Not provided 
Not provided 
$10.00-$13.00 
Not provided 
Not provided 
Not provided 
Not provided 
Not provided 
$10.00-15.00 
Not provided 
$9.50 
$9.50 
$9.50 
Not provided 
Not provided 
Not provided 
$11.80-$16.208 
$11.80-$16.208 
$11.80-$16.208 
$9.9Q-$15.40* 
$9,90-$15.40* 
$11.80-$16.208 
$9.10-$12.00* 
$9.10-$12.00* 
$9.10-$12.00* 
*based on January 2005 publication 
Copies of these ads are provided in Section Four of this report. 
MARKETABILITY . 
Mr. Ranson's most marketable skills are in construction trades, however it has been a 
number of years since Mr. Ranson worked full time in a competitive position. He would 
benefit from professional assistance to learn job seeking skills to locate jobs in the 
^h idden" job market, to develop a resume emphasizing his skills, and to learn interview 
skills. Professional assistance is available through private career counselors and the 
Department of Workforce Services. 
Marketability is determined by an Individual's skills and the Current job market. The 
outlook for employment in the various occupations is rated by the Department of Work 
Force Services based on employment the demand for workers and wages paid. 
Occupations are assigned a star rank based on the projected number of Utah job 
openings between 2002 and 2012 and how fast the occupation is expected to grow over 
that time period and the median annual wages. 
The Utah occupational outlook for Cabinetmakers and Bench Carpenters, Construction 
Managers, Customer Service Representatives and Computer Support Technician is 
rated three star (out of five), representing a moderate to strong employment outlook and 
low to moderate wages. 
Cost Estimator, Carpenter and First Line Supervisors/Mangers are rated five star. Five-
star occupations have the strongest employment outlook and high wages. 
Labor market research results indicate there are currently a number of advertised job 
openings that Mr. Ranson could pursue. With a focused effort, he would probably be 
able to locate a full-time position within thirty to forty five days. In the Utah labor market, 
the 4.9% rate of unemployment creates a positive market for job seekers. 
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Mr. Ranson's ability to locate a suitable job quickly would be enhanced with participation 
in employment workshops for job seeking skills, resume writing, interview skills and job 
keeping skills. These workshops are offered through the Department of Workforce 
Services. Individual assistance is available through private career counselors, the 
University of Utah and at times through Community Education programs. 
POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT 
1. Current inactive labor force status * 
2. Lengthy absence from the work forced 
3. Lack of job goal and knowledge of labor market opportunities^ 
These vocational barriers could be minimized through work with a vocational counselor 
or job placement specialist to identify jobs compatible with his interests and abilities and 
guide vocational exploration to identify realistic options and steps necessary to 
formulate a plan to return to work. Salt Lake Community College and the University of 
Utah have career placement assistance including vocational testing and counseling 
services. 
Mr. Ranson has stated to others that he would like to complete a Bachelor's Degree 
then pursue graduate education in film studies with a goal of becoming a University 
Professor. It is unlikely he could achieve this goal considering his age of 54. Although 
he may be able to complete the Bachelor's degree, there is a great deal of competition 
for the limited number of seats in graduate programs, where admission is based on 
professional achievement as well as academic achievement. Competition for an 
academic teaching position is likely to be very keen and it is more likely than not that he 
would not be successful in achieving that goal. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Considering Mr. Ranson's current vocational resources, his options are to obtain 
immediate employment in an area of the construction industry as either a carpenter or 
as a supervisor or use his computer knowledge and expertise to obtain an entry level 
job that would provide opportunities to build a career in computer information 
technology or a related area. 
Recommendations for Mr. Ranson to begin an efficient job search effort would include 
these steps: 
• Register for work with the Department of Work Force Services to receive 
referrals to current job openings. 
• Complete the skill match form to receive referrals for employment with the state 
of Utah. 
• Attend the free workshops sponsored by the Department of Work Force Services 
to learn job seeking techniques, how to write a resume and successful interview 
skills. 
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• Attend job fairs sponsored through the Department of Work Force Services to 
meet potential employers. 
• Register for work with temporary placement agencies. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Based on his work experience and the current labor market, Mr. Ranson's minimum 
starting salary could be expected to range from $19,760 as a Customer Service 
Representative, $24,336 as a Finish Carpenter, up to $32,864 as a First-Line 
Supervisor/Manager of Construction Trades Workers. I would expect a steady increase 
in earnings once he demonstrates his abilities and develops current work experience. 
The conclusions detailed above are based on methodology used and accepted by 
Rehabilitation Specialists considered reliable pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael. The conclusions are based on the 
information reviewed at the time the report was prepared and any additional or different 
information could alter the opinions. 
If you have any question regarding this analysis, please let me know. 
Best regards, 
Xristy Farnsworth, Ph.D. 
Diplomate, ABVE 
CRC, CVE, CDMS 
KF:me 
Attachments: 
Section One - Utah Metro Occupational Projections 2002 - 2012 
Section Two - Occupational Reports 
Section Three - Workforce Services Job Orders 
Section Four - Tribune Ads 
Section Five - Current Resume and List of Cases 
ADDENDUM K 
ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY #2665 
Attorney for Respondent 
Bank of the West Building 
140 W. 9000 South, Suite 7 
Sandy, UT 84070-2033 
Telephone: (801)566-9286 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
KENNETH CLARK RANSON, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
MARIANNA DI PAOLO, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 044900818 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
) Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court on August 16, 17, 25, and 29, 2005. 
Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Bridget K. Romano. Respondent was 
present and represented by counsel, Robert D. Pusey. The Court, having received the 
stipulations of the parties; having heard the testimony of the witnesses; having reviewed the 
exhibits entered into evidence; having fully considered the evidence presented and the 
arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully informed in the premises, hereby enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Jurisdiction and Grounds: 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were each actual and bona fide residents of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah at the time the Verified Complaint for Divorce was filed in this 
matter, and each has maintained such residency for more than three months immediately prior 
to the commencement of this action. 
2. Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, having married on February 
28, 1986 in Salt Lake City, state of Utah. 
3. During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable differences have developed 
between the parties, making the continuation of their marriage impossible. 
Custody and Parent Time. 
4. Petitioner and Respondent have one minor child born as issue of their 
marriage, Sean Ranson, born December 2, 1987. No further children are expected. 
5. The minor child has resided in Salt Lake County for at least six (6) continuous 
months and the state of Utah is the child's home state of residency. 
6. Neither party has participated as a party, a witness, or in any other capacity in 
litigation concerning custody of the minor child in Utah or any other state. 
7. Neither party has knowledge of any custody proceeding concerning the minor 
child in any other court of Utah or any other state or of any person not a party to this action 
who has physical custody of the child or who claims to have custody or parent time rights to 
the child. 
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8. Neither party has applied for or received public assistance for themselves or 
the minor child therefore the State of Utah need not be joined to this action. 
9. Petitioner and Respondent shall be awarded joint legal and physical custody of 
Sean Ranson. 
10. The Court cannot legally award either party parent time with the minor child 
after December 2, 2005, the child's eighteenth birthday. 
11. Upon attaining legal majority, Sean Ranson may determine how he will share 
time with Petitioner and Respondent and the court therefore declines to address the parties' 
respective requests regarding the 2006 Easter and spring break periods. 
12. The Court denies Petitioner's request to "flip" the present parent time schedule 
and to award to Petitioner that end of the schedule Respondent has enjoyed, and vice versa. 
13. The Court finds, instead, that until Sean Ranson attains the age of 18 on 
December 2, 2005, Petitioner and Respondent shall share parent time with the child on an 
equal basis and shall alternate parent time on weekly basis, from Sunday evening to Sunday 
evening. 
14. Said schedule shall commence immediately, with Petitioner having the first 
full week of parent time. 
15. Petitioner and Respondent shall alternate holiday parent time on an equal basis 
and shall alternate every other holiday as set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 until 
Sean attains the age of 18 on December 2, 2005. Said holiday timesharing shall commence 
on Labor Day, September 2, 2005, which holiday time shall belong to Respondent. 
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Child Support. 
16. Petitioner is presently unemployed and it is reasonable to impute income to 
him in the amount $32,000 per year, or $2,666.66 gross monthly income. Respondent is 
employed at the University of Utah and earns $78,300 per year, or $6,525 gross monthly 
income. Effective September 1, 2005, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the 
amount of $171 per month as set forth in the Child Support Worksheet attached as Exhibit A 
hereto. Child support shall be payable on the 5th and 20th day of each month and shall 
continue until the minor child graduates from high school in his normal expected year. 
17. The parties' shall pay the child's education-related expenses, including private 
school tuition, books and fees in the approximate amount of $15,000, from the parties' E-
Trade Money Market Account. 
Health Needs of the Child. 
18. So long as child support is due, each party shall obtain and maintain health, 
hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental 
health, prescription drug and any other medical and dental insurance coverage for the benefit 
of Sean Ranson whenever it is available to him or her through employment at reasonable cost. 
19. In the event of a conflict between the parties relative to insurance coverage, the 
Court shall consider the reasonableness of the cost of each plan and the availability of group 
coverage. 
4 
20. Petitioner and Respondent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the 
premium actually paid by a party for the dependent child's portion of insurance, which 
expense shall be added to or deducted from the base amount of child support. The child's 
portion of the premium expenses shall be deemed the per capita share of the premium actually 
paid by a party. 
21. Petitioner and Respondent shall share equally all uninsured medical, dental, 
hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental 
health, prescription drug, and any other related expenses, including deductibles and co-
payments, incurred for the dependent child and actually paid by the parties. 
22. The parties shall cooperate to exchange all claim forms and statements 
received from or by insurance companies in an effort to coordinate the payment of such 
expenses and consistent with Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.15, each party who carries 
J 
insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the other upon initial enrollment of the 
child, and thereafter on or before December 1 of each year. Each party who maintains 
insurance coverage shall notify the other of any change of insurance carrier, premium or 
benefit within thirty (30) calendar days of the date the party knew or the change. 
23. Each party who incurs medical, dental, hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, 
optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental health, prescription drug, and any 
other related expenses, including deductibles and co-payments for the child shall provide 
written verification of the expense to the other within sixty (60) days of payment. A party 
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who fails to comply with this provision may be denied the right to receive credit or to recover 
the other parent's share of the expense. 
Dependency Tax Exemption. 
24. Respondent shall be awarded the right to claim the minor child as a 
dependency exemption on her state and federal income tax returns each year. 
Real Property. 
25. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired an interest in a building 
lot and residence located at 2096 East 10095 South, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which 
real property the parties agree has a market value of $176,500. 
26. The Court finds the parties purchased the building lot as a joint venture and 
with use of investment income and earnings Petitioner deposited into joint checking accounts 
and income and earnings Respondent deposited into joint checking accounts. 
27. The Court finds the parties commingled their income and earnings in these 
joint checking accounts and paid all of their bills and expenses related to their general upkeep 
and maintenance, and related to the purchase of the lot, from the above-referenced joint 
checking accounts. 
2£. The Court finds no sufficient legal or equitable basis to grant Petitioner's 
request to reserve to him the sum of $21,000 from the value of the marital home for 
Petitioner's claimed purchase of the building lot and therefore denies that request. 
29. Petitioner shall be awarded the martial residence located at 2096 East 10095 
South as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim by Respondent. 
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Respondent shall immediately execute and deliver to Petitioner a Quit Claim Deed in 
Petitioner's favor upon entry of a final Decree of Divorce. 
Personal Property. 
30. During the course of the marriage, Petitioner and Respondent have acquired a 
number of items of personal property. The parties have previously, generally divided their 
personal property in a fair and equitable fashion. 
31. Petitioner and Respondent shall be awarded as his or her sole and separate 
property all items of real property currently found in his or her respective name, or in his or 
her respective possession, except as more specifically designated below: 
TO PETITIONER: 
1. Olympus digital camera; 
2. Petitioner's Army uniform; 
3. Petitioner's past school papers; 
4. Petitioner's personal files, to include his apprenticeship and journeyman 
certificates, if Respondent has them; 
5. Tohono O'odham basket nos. 1,4 and 5, ranked accordingly to size of 
opening, with 1 being the largest; 
6. 1 set of crystal wineglasses; and 
7. 1992 Honda Accord vehicle. 
TO RESPONDENT: 
1. Antique electric typewriter; 
2. Grandfather's garden tools; 
3. Childhood dresser (currently in use by minor child); 
4. Brother's antique highchair; 
5. Handles to maple buffet; 
6. Respondent's employment files; 
7. Antique canning jars; 
8. Petitioner's family Christmas ornaments; 
9. Tohono O'odham basket nos. 2 and 3 ranked accordingly to size of opening, 
with 1 being the largest; and 
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10. 2002 Subaru Outback vehicle. 
Bank and Depository Accounts. 
32. Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded his or her own bank and 
depository accounts. 
Investment Accounts. 
33. During the course of the marriage, Petitioner and Respondent acquired an 
interest in certain investment accounts, including two E*Trade accounts currently valued at 
the approximate amount of $180,000. 
34. The parties shall pay the costs related to the minor child's private school 
tuition and bundled billing in the approximate amount of $15,000 prior to dividing between 
themselves their investment funds. 
35. Petitioner shall then be awarded the sum of $5,265 as a concession for the 
disparity in the value of the vehicles awarded the respective parties in paragraph no. 31 above. 
36. Thereafter, Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded one-half of all 
remaining interest in the investment funds accrued in the E*Trade accounts set out above. 
37. Petitioner shall direct the division of these accounts immediately upon entry of 
a final Decree of Divorce by awarding to each party an equal number of shares of each age 
class and issue of stock, so that the total value, tax burden and type of stock are equalized. 
When an odd number of shares exist in any lot, the additional odd share shall be divided on an 
alternating basis as the stock appears on the E-Trade account report, with Petitioner to receive 
the first additional share. 
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Retirement Benefits. 
38. Both before and during the course of the parties' marriage, Respondent 
accrued certain retirement benefits through her employment at the University of Utah through 
her TIAA and CREF accounts, which have an approximate value of $296,968. 
39. Respondent shall be awarded her separate, premarital interest in these 
retirement benefits in the amount of $21,500 and shall be awarded the additional sum of 
$176,500 from these retirement benefits to provide parity pursuant to Petitioner's receipt of 
the parties' marital residence in paragraph no. 29 above. 
40. Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded one-half of the remaining 
retirement benefits in the approximate amount of $98,968, which one-half interests shall be 
adjusted by any earnings or losses accruing from the date of valuation on or about June 30, 
2005 through the date of actual distribution. 
41. Petitioner's interests in these TIAA and CREF plans shall be secured by a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order prepared by Petitioner's counsel and subject to approval 
as to form by Respondent's counsel. 
Debts and Obligations. 
42. Petitioner and Respondent have no remaining or known joint debts or 
obligations. 
43. Petitioner and Respondent shall separately assume, be responsible for, 
indemnify and hold the other harmless from any and all debts and/or obligations incurred by 
him or her or in his or her sole and separate name or for his or her separate benefit. 
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Alimony. 
44. This Court finds alimony is neither an annuity nor a penalty, but is designed to 
assist one spouse in terms of a need for financial assistance. 
45. The Court finds further it may make and enter an alimony award pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(8) and the factors set forth therein, which factors include: 1) 
the financial condition of the requesting spouse; 2) the financial need of the requesting 
spouse; 3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 4) the ability of the 
requesting spouse to provide for his or her own support. 
46. The Court finds Petitioner's financial condition as follows: 
a. Petitioner is presently unemployed and enrolled as a full-time 
student at the University of Utah; 
b. Petitioner receives a small income from his independent land 
investments; 
c. Petitioner receives a small income from his security 
investments; 
d. As agreed herein, Petitioner shall be awarded the marital 
residence, which has a market value of $176,500 and no related mortgage 
indebtedness; 
e. As agreed herein, Petitioner shall be awarded cash in the 
approximate amount of $85,000; 
f. Petitioner has no automobile payment; and 
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g. Petitioner has no consumer debt but has "other debt" in the form 
of loan to Petitioner from his mother in the approximate amount of $39,000, 
which debt is not supported by a contract or note and which loan was made to 
Petitioner by his mother contingent upon Petitioner's ability to repay the same. 
47. The Court finds Petitioner's financial needs are more problematic to articulate 
and the Court must take into account the parties' "standard of living." 
48. The Court refuses to consider or to factor in Petitioner's "one time" expenses 
or expenses which will come to a quick end following entry of a final decree; namely, 
Petitioner's repayment of the loan from his mother and his payment of attorney fees related to 
this matter. 
49. The Court likewise refuses to consider Petitioner's expenses that are 
attributable to a third person. 
50. The Court refuses to factor in or to consider any education or tuition expenses, 
whether they are incurred by Petitioner or on behalf of the minor child. 
51. The Court must evaluate Petitioner's "ongoing" expenses in order to properly 
evaluate his "standard of living" which expenses include Petitioner's monthly and ongoing 
insurance, food, clothing, and entertainment expenses and the like. 
52. The Court finds Petitioner to have reasonable monthly need in the amount of 
$2,500. 
53. The Court finds Respondent possesses the ability to pay the amount of $2,500 
in and for Petitioner's support. 
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54. Upon the testimony and evidence adduced by Petitioner and Respondent at 
trial and upon the testimony of Dr. Kristy Farnsworth, the Court finds employment is 
available to Petitioner at the rate of $32,000 per year. 
55. The Court rejects Petitioner's testimony that his age prohibits him from 
earning income at this level. 
56. The court rejects Petitioner's claim that his health, which includes ocular 
migraines and adverse medication reactions, renders Petitioner unemployable or unable to 
earn income at the rate of $32,000 per year. 
57. The Court is not convinced Petitioner's health problems adversely impact his 
ability to be employed. 
58. The Court finds Petitioner is underemployed and that he possesses the ability 
to produce an income for his own self-support. 
59. Upon the foregoing, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Petitioner is able to support himself and to enjoy gross annual income of $32,000, or gross 
monthly income in the amount of $2,666. Accordingly, the Court finds Petitioner is able to 
meet his own monthly needs and therefore an award of permanent alimony is not warranted. 
60. The Court declines to award Petitioner any sum in and for rehabilitative 
alimony. 
61. The Court also finds upon the testimony of Dr. Farnsworth, Petitioner may 
experience of transition period of up to 90 days before he is able to realize income equal to 
$32,000 per year. 
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62. However, the Court finds that given the fact Petitioner has been awarded cash 
in the amount of $85,000 and a home valued at $176,500, Petitioner has sufficient assets to 
draw upon and therefore declines to award Petitioner any time as a transition period. 
63. Accordingly, no alimony is awarded to Petitioner. 
Attorney Fees. 
64. Each party shall assume and pay his or her own attorney fees and costs 
incurred in this matter. 
Disclosure. 
65. Should either party discover the existence of undisclosed property, the other 
shall be entitled to receive an equal portion of such property. 
Cooperation. 
66. Petitioner and Respondent shall cooperate in clearing title or in transferring 
assets to accomplish the purpose and intent of these Findings. Each party shall execute any 
and all documents necessary to carry out the terms of the Decree of Divorce immediately 
upon execution and entry of the same. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this 
action. 
2. Petitioner shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce from Respondent upon the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decree to be absolute and final upon entry. 
3. The Decree of Divorce shall conform to the Findings of Fact made herein. 
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ROBERT DEVIN PUSEY #2665 
Attorney for Respondent 
Bank of the West Building 
140 W. 9000 South, Suite 7 
Sandy, UT 84070-2033 
Telephone: (801) 566-9286 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
KENNETH CLARK RANSON, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
MARJANNA DI PAOLO, ; 
Respondent. ] 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
> Civil No. 044900818 
Judge Joseph C. Fratto 
) Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court on August 16, 17, 25, and 29, 2005. 
Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Bridget K. Romano. Respondent was 
present and represented by counsel, Robert D. Pusey. The Court, having received the 
stipulations of the parties; having heard the testimony of the witnesses; having reviewed the 
exhibits entered into evidence; and the arguments of counsel; and having previously entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
Decree of Divorce. 
1. Petitioner Kenneth Clark Ranson is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from 
respondent Marianna Di Paolo on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, such decree to* 
become final upon signing, entry and the determination of the Court. 
Custody and Parent Time. 
2. Petitioner and Respondent have one minor child born as issue of their 
marriage, Sean Ranson, born December 2, 1987. No further children are expected. 
3. Petitioner and Respondent shall be awarded joint legal and physical custody of 
Sean Ranson. 
4. Upon attaining legal majority on December 2, 2005, Sean Ranson may 
determine how he will share time with Petitioner and Respondent and the court therefore 
declines to address the parties' respective requests regarding the 2006 Easter and spring break 
periods. 
5. Petitioner and Respondent shall share parent time with Sean Ranson on an 
equal basis and shall alternate parent time on a weekly basis, from Sunday evening to Sunday 
evening, until the child attains the age of 18 on December 2, 2005. 
6. Said schedule shall commence immediately, with Petitioner having the first 
full week of parent time. 
7. Petitioner and Respondent shall alternate holiday parent time on an equal basis 
and shall alternate every other holiday as set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 until 
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Sean attains the age of 18 on December 2, 2005. Said holiday timesharing shall commence 
on Labor Day, September 2, 2005, which holiday time shall belong to Respondent. 
Child Support. 
8. Petitioner is presently unemployed and it is reasonable to impute income to 
him in the amount $32,000 per year, or $2,666.66 gross monthly income. Respondent is 
employed at the University of Utah and earns $78,300 per year, or $6,525 gross monthly 
income. Effective September 1, 2005, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the 
amount of $171 per month as set forth in the Child Support Worksheet attached as Exhibit A 
hereto. Child support shall be payable on the 5th and 20th day of each month and shall 
continue until the minor child graduates from high school in his normal expected year. 
9. The parties' shall pay the child's education-related expenses, including private 
school tuition, books and fees in the approximate amount of $15,000, from the parties' E-
Trade Money Market Account. 
Health Needs of the Child. 
10. So long as child support is due, each party shall obtain and maintain health, 
hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental 
health, prescription drug and any other medical and dental insurance coverage for the benefit 
of Sean Ranson whenever it is available to him or her through employment at reasonable cost. 
11. In the event of a conflict between the parties relative to insurance coverage, 
the Court shall consider the reasonableness of the cost of each plan and the availability of 
group coverage. 
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12. Petitioner and Respondent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the 
premium actually paid by a party for the dependent child's portion of insurance, which 
expense shall be added to or deducted from the base amount of child support. The child's 
portion of the premium expenses shall be deemed the per capita share of the premium actually 
paid by a party. 
13. Petitioner and Respondent shall share equally all uninsured medical, dental, 
hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental 
health, prescription drug, and any other related expenses, including deductibles and co-
payments, incurred for the dependent child and actually paid by the parties. 
14. The parties shall cooperate to exchange all claim forms and statements 
received from or by insurance companies in an effort to coordinate the payment of such 
expenses and consistent with Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.15, each party who carries 
insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the other upon initial enrollment of the 
child, and thereafter on or before December 1 of each year. Each party who maintains 
insurance coverage shall notify the other of any change of insurance carrier, premium or 
benefit within thirty (30) calendar days of the date the party knew or the change. 
15. Each party who incurs medical, dental, hospitalization, dental, orthodontic, 
optical and eye-care, counseling and treatment, mental health, prescription drug, and any 
other related expenses, including deductibles and co-payments for the child shall provide 
written verification of the expense to the other within sixty (60) days of payment. A party 
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who fails to comply with this provision may be denied the right to receive credit or to recover 
the other parent's share of the expense. 
Dependency Tax Exemption. 
16. Respondent shall be awarded the right to claim the minor child as a 
dependency exemption on her state and federal income tax returns each year. 
Real Property. 
17. Petitioner shall be awarded the martial residence located at 2096 East 10095 
South as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim by Respondent. 
Respondent shall immediately execute and deliver to Petitioner a Quit Claim Deed in 
Petitioner's favor upon entry of a final Decree of Divorce. 
Personal Property. 
18. Petitioner and Respondent shall be awarded as his or her sole and separate 
property all items of real property currently found in his or her respective name, or in his or 
her respective possession, except as more specifically designated below: 
TO PETITIONER: 
, 1. Olympus digital camera; 
2. Petitioner's Army uniform; 
3. Petitioner's past school papers; 
4. Petitioner's personal files, to include his apprenticeship and journeyman 
certificates if Respondent has them; 
5. Tohono O'odham basket nos. 1, 4 and 5, ranked accordingly to size of 
opening, with 1 being the largest; 
6. 1 set of crystal wineglasses; and 
7. 1992 Honda Accord vehicle. 
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TO RESPONDENT: 
1. Antique electric typewriter; 
2. Grandfather's garden tools; 
3. Childhood dresser (currently in use by minor child); 
4. Brother's antique highchair; 
5. Handles to maple buffet; 
6. Respondent's employment files; 
7. Antique canning j ars; 
8. Petitioner's family Christmas ornaments; 
9. Tohono O'odham basket nos. 2 and 3 ranked accordingly to size of opening, 
with 1 being the largest; and 
10. 2002 Subaru Outback vehicle. 
Bank and Depository Accounts. 
19. Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded his or her own bank and 
depository accounts. 
Investment Accounts. 
20. During the course of the marriage, Petitioner and Respondent acquired an 
interest in certain investment accounts, including two E*Trade accounts currently valued at 
the approximate amount of $180,000. 
21. The parties shall pay the costs related to the minor child's private school 
tuition and bundled billing in the approximate amount of $15,000 prior to dividing between 
themselves their investment funds. 
22. Petitioner shall then be awarded the sum of $5,265 as a concession for the 
disparity in the value of the vehicles awarded the respective parties in paragraph no. 18 above. 
23. Thereafter, Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded one-half of all 
remaining interest in the investment funds accrued in the E*Trade accounts set out above. 
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24. Petitioner shall direct the division of these accounts immediately upon entry of 
a final Decree of Divorce by awarding to each party an equal number of shares of each age 
class and issue of stock, so that the total value, tax burden and type of stock are equalized. 
When an odd number of shares exist in any lot, the additional odd share shall be divided on an 
alternating basis as the stock appears on the E-Trade account report, with Petitioner to receive 
the first additional share. 
Retirement Benefits. 
25. Both before and during the course of the parties' marriage, Respondent 
accrued certain retirement benefits through her employment at the University of Utah through 
her TIAA and CREF accounts, which have an approximate value of $296,968. 
26. Respondent shall be awarded her separate, premarital interest in these 
retirement benefits in the amount of $21,500 and shall be awarded the additional sum of 
$176,500 from these retirement benefits to provide parity pursuant to Petitioner's receipt of 
the parties' marital residence in paragraph no. 17 above. 
27. Petitioner and Respondent shall each be awarded one-half of the remaining 
retirement benefits in the approximate amount of $98,968, which one-half interests shall be 
adjusted by any earnings or losses accruing from the date of valuation on or about June 30, 
2005 through the date of actual distribution. 
28. Petitioner's interests in these TIAA and CREF plans shall be secured by a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order prepared by Petitioner's counsel and subject to approval 
as to form by Respondent's counsel. 
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Debts and Obligations. 
29. Petitioner and Respondent have no remaining or known joint debts or 
obligations. 
30. Petitioner and Respondent shall separately assume, be responsible for, 
indemnify and hold the other harmless from any and all debts and/or obligations incurred by 
him or her or in his or her sole and separate name or for his or her separate benefit. 
Alimony. 
31. No alimony is awarded to Petitioner. 
Attorney Fees. 
32. Each party shall assume and pay his or her own attorney fees and costs 
incurred in this matter. 
Disclosure. 
33. Should either party discover the existence of undisclosed property, the other 
shall be entitled to receive an equal portion of such property. 
Cooperation. 
34. Petitioner and Respondent shall cooperate in clearing title or in transferring 
assets to accomplish the purpose and intent of this Decree of Divorce. Each party shall 
execute any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms of this Decree of Divorce 
immediately upon execution and entry of the same. 
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